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ACUTE POVERTY: The Fatal Flaw in
U.S. Anti-Poverty Law
David A. Super*
Debates over inequality have largely ignored the largest body of people living in poverty.
Although anti-poverty policymaking focuses overwhelmingly on the chronic poor, a far larger number
of people suffer occasional acute bouts of poverty. The causes of the acute poor’s problems, and their
needs, differ significantly from those of the chronic poor. Even short spells of poverty can cause
serious, physical, psychological, and material harm as well as impairment in their ability to return
to their former circumstances.
Demographically, the acute poor resemble the general population far more than the chronic
poor, yet they receive little sympathy: politicians may praise them in the abstract, but all too often
the acute poor become collateral damage in struggles over the treatment of the chronic poor. The
standard model of public welfare law, which is built around avoiding moral hazard, ill-fits the
acute poor. A combination of eligibility limits, arduous procedures, deliberate stigmatization,
waiting lists, and conduct requirements reduces the chronic poor’s receipt of aid but often affects the
acute poor even more powerfully. More recently, some politicians have begun to attack the acute poor
directly. The acute poor pay for the safety net in good times but cannot access it in bad.
Replacing the standard model of public welfare law would allow limited public funds to better
serve all low-income people, acute and chronic alike. Greater attention to the acute poor would
reduce their hardship and could lead to reexamination of some overly simplistic ideas about the
chronic poor as well.

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University. The author is grateful for the research assistance of Monica
Martinez and Thanh Nguyen, for the comments of participants in workshops at the law schools of
Columbia, Emory, Georgetown and Michigan, and for the careful and insightful editing of Michelle
Avidisyans and Lauren Navarro.
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INTRODUCTION
Census Bureau data released in 2018 showed broad income growth at a pace
not seen since the late 1990s, with real median income rising sharply for the third
consecutive year.1 Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, the United States had eleven
consecutive years of economic growth. The official unemployment rate was below
4% after many years above 5% since the end of the 1990s boom.2 The dollar was
strong,3 the housing sector was booming,4 stock prices were at or near record highs,5
and the federal deficit had been shrinking rapidly away before Congress deliberately
increased it with a huge tax cut.6 With the economies of Europe and Japan in the
doldrums, and Brazil, China, and other formerly fast-growing countries hitting the
skids, this country’s economy should have been the envy of the world.
Yet discontent was widespread. Polls about the direction of the country
consistently said that we were on the wrong track by almost twenty percentage
points.7 In the last presidential election, an apparent long-shot populist candidate
channeling widespread anger came close to upending the establishment in one of
our major political parties; another did so in the other party and then stunned
political experts by winning the presidency. Along the way, radical third parties’
presidential candidates were polling 10% deep into September, when voters usually
have coalesced around the major party nominees.8 Although President Trump is
polarizing in the near-term, groups on both the Left and the Right are so angry they

1. KAYLA FONTENOT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-263, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2017, at 5 (2018). Median income in 2018 continued to rise, albeit by a statistically
insignificant amount. JESSICA SEMEGA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-266, INCOME AND
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2018, at 3 (2019).
2. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, USDL-20-0180, THE EMPLOYMENT
SITUATION – JANUARY 2020, at 1–2 (2020). The unemployment rate began rising with the onset of the
2001 recession and reached 5% in September of that year.
3. Jeanna Smialek, How the Fed Chairman Is Shielding It from Trump, N.Y. TIMES ( Jan. 28,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/business/economy/federal-reserve-jay-powell.html
[ https://perma.cc/SZF2-D7TH ]; Maggie Fitzgerald, The US Dollar Just Hit a Two-Year High and Is
Threatening to Make Another Major Milestone, CNBC (Sept. 3, 2019, 9:03 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/03/the-us-dollar-just-hit-a-two-year-high-and-is-threatening-tomake-another-major-milestone.html [ https://perma.cc/V8NE-AX72].
4. Kathy Orton, Experts Predict What the 2020 Housing Market Will Bring, WASH. POST
( Jan. 6, 2020, 10:05 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/01/06/experts-predictwhat-housing-market-will-bring/ [ https://perma.cc/HH73-QBUA ].
5. Herbert Lash, Stocks Surge to Record Highs on Hopes Virus Is Peaking, Gold Ebbs, REUTERS
(Feb. 11, 2020, 4:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-markets/stocks-surge-torecord-highs-on-hopes-virus-is-peaking-gold-ebbs-idUSKBN20501G [ https://perma.cc/BS98-546L ].
6. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 52801, AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: 2017 TO 2027, at 10 (2017).
7. Direction of Country, REALCLEARPOLITICS, https://realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/
direction_of_country-902.html [ https://perma.cc/SZ3W-QFS5 ] ( last visited Feb. 11, 2020 ).
8. General Election: Trump vs. Clinton vs. Johnson vs. Stein, REALCLEARPOLITICS, http://
www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/us/general_election_trump_vs_clinton_vs_
johnson_vs_stein-5952.html [ https://perma.cc/GB3V-4TGJ ] ( last visited Sept. 14, 2016 ).
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are coming close to calling a second constitutional convention,9 which could put
the very fabric of our democracy up for grabs.10
The primary source of this discontent, despite all the rosy statistics, is
economic. Bernie Sanders won enthusiastic support with forceful criticism of
economic inequality, and inequality was central to many candidates’ 2020
campaigns. This message clearly resonated with the lived experience of
many people.
Economic dissatisfaction is at the core of Donald Trump’s ascendancy as well.
A good deal of his message was one of economic revival. But even the other aspects
of his appeal have a strong hidden economic component. Trump supporters
disproportionately feel politically marginalized,11 but even the focus of this anger is
economic: they believe that the elites have rigged the economy against them.
President Trump’s support also depended significantly on racial animus, with strong
evidence suggesting that hostility to African-Americans is the single best predictor
of support for his candidacy.12 But racism has been endemic throughout this
country’s history; the effectiveness of race-based appeals varies depending on the
general level of unease among the whites to whom those appeals are made.13
Intensity of xenophobia, too, rises and falls with economic insecurity. The persistent
unemployment that followed the Great Recession left those with latent racial
resentments claiming that “their” jobs had gone to people of color. This made them
receptive to the Tea Party’s appeals.14 Although President Trump did not follow the
Tea Party script—his professed reluctance to cut major middle-class entitlements

9. See States Calling for an Article V Convention, BBA TASK FORCE, http://bba4usa.org/
[ https://perma.cc/C4BL-2SXF ] ( last visited April 2, 2020 ) (claiming to be only six states short of
compelling Congress to call a convention).
10. David Super, A Constitutional Convention Would Be a Brexit-Scale Crisis for the U.S.,
L.A. TIMES ( July 7, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-super-constitutionalconvention-balanced-budget-amendment-20160706-snap-story.html
[ https://perma.cc/2FSZW85Y ].
11. Michael Pollard & Joshua Mendelsohn, RAND Kicks Off 2016 Presidential Election Panel
Survey, RAND ( Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/01/rand-kicks-off-2016presidential-election-panel-survey.html [ https://perma.cc/L9GQ-FMVY ] (finding that voters
believing that people like them lack a political voice were 86% more likely to support Trump).
12. Jason McDaniel & Sean McElwee, Racial Resentment and the Rise of Donald Trump,
W. POL. SCI. ASS’N: NEW W. (Mar. 27, 2016), https://thewpsa.wordpress.com/2016/03/27/racialresentment-and-the-rise-of-donald-trump/ [ https://perma.cc/8PQV-GJER ].
13. For example, the economic dislocations of the early 1970s allowed George Wallace, a
prominent opponent of civil rights, to win the Michigan Democratic primary in 1972 and do well in
working-class neighborhoods around the country. JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE PRICE OF
CIVILIZATION: REAWAKENING AMERICAN VIRTUE AND PROSPERITY 69 (2011). Going back further,
years of virulent racist assaults on federal protection of freed slaves in the South finally won an end to
Reconstruction when the Long Depression, beginning in 1873, stoked insecurity among
northern whites.
14. See ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, PARTISAN POLARIZATION AND THE RISE OF THE TEA PARTY
MOVEMENT 11–12 (2011), http://faculty.washington.edu/jwilker/353/AbramowitzTea.pdf [ https:/
/perma.cc/W6CG-K84M ] (finding racial animus an important determinant of support for the Tea
Party movement).
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such as Social Security and Medicare fits badly with the Tea Party’s avowed
commitment to small government—his message that white Americans’ jobs were
being lost to people of color within and outside our borders fit that resentment
even better.15
The intensity of this sense of economic grievance has perplexed most of the
political and economic establishment, in part because it does not correspond to the
measures of economic well-being that they are accustomed to tracking. Democrats
complain that President Obama did not receive the credit he was due for vast
improvements in the economy since he took office.16 Republicans are perplexed
that they lost the 2018 midterm elections despite historically low unemployment.
Democrats insist the lower-middle-class voters that put Donald Trump over the top
in key swing states ought to have been more grateful to Democrats, in particular for
the Affordable Care Act; Republicans insist that Democrats have neglected these
voters but are privately anxious that they have little to offer them.17 Both seem
deeply confused about the source of popular anger. Economically anxious voters
see the political and economic elite as dismissive of their problems and gravitate
increasingly to outsiders almost without regard to those candidates’ programs.18
Notwithstanding elites’ befuddlement, economic insecurity is a real and
growing problem in this country—and one that the dominant model of anti-poverty
law has failed miserably to address. The Great Recession, although not matching
the Great Depression’s total impact, nonetheless transformed much of society,
spawning staggering amounts of long-term unemployment and eliminating
industries that had long provided a stable, decent standard of living to millions of
low-skilled workers.19 The shift from manufacturing to the service economy
typically costs men without college degrees 15–20% of their wages.20 In the decade
15. Indeed, President Trump seems to have reengaged a crucial part of the coalition that helped
Franklin Roosevelt enact the New Deal: those that support generous social welfare programs for whites
while denying aid to people of color. Paul Krugman, Trump in a Box, N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE
OF A LIBERAL (Aug. 19, 2015, 1:48 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/19/trump-ina-box/ [ https://perma.cc/29TR-DL2X ].
16. In 2008, candidate Obama spoke condescendingly about low-skilled, small-town workers as
bitterly clinging to unrealistic economic hopes and turning to guns, religion, and xenophobia for solace.
Michael Saul, Obama: Some Pennsylvanians ‘Bitter,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 12, 2008, 4:53 PM), https://
www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/obama-pennsylvanians-bitter-article-1.283600 [ https://
perma.cc/7XEQ-3AHU ].
17. Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, In Private, Republican Lawmakers Agonize over Health Law
Repeal, N.Y. TIMES ( Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/affordablecare-act-republican-retreat.html [ https://perma.cc/B3P2-ZXM4 ].
18. Significant numbers of Trump voters reported that Sanders was their second choice, and
vice versa. Thomas B. Edsall, The Trump-Sanders Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/24/opinion/campaign-stops/the-trump-sandersfantasy.html [ https://perma.cc/7VUD-JMZJ ].
19. DOUGLAS E. SCHOEN, HOPELESSLY DIVIDED: THE NEW CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS
AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR 2012 AND BEYOND 2 (2012) [ hereinafter SCHOEN,
HOPELESSLY DIVIDED] .
20. JARED BERNSTEIN, CRUNCH: WHY DO I FEEL SO SQUEEZED (AND OTHER UNSOLVED
ECONOMIC MYSTERIES) 21 (2008).
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prior to the Great Recession, the cost of childcare rose at twice the rate of inflation,
college tuition at almost three times, and the median homes and out-of-pocket
health care costs at three times the rate.21 To the extent that families’ real incomes
have risen, it is because of increased earnings from women, which has reduced their
capacity to provide extremely valuable if unmonetized labor in the home.22
The four years immediately following the Great Recession—from 2009 to
2012—saw historically low income mobility.23 Those with lower incomes were the
most likely to have their incomes stagnate or decline.24 The occupations expected
to add the most jobs in coming years are disproportionately at the low end of the
pay scale.25 With the number of low-skilled jobs insufficient to accommodate the
number of workers needing them, employers have been able to erode both the
wages and the dignity of these positions.26 Wage theft, arbitrary discipline,
uncorrected workplace hazards, and involuntary conversion to sham independent
contractor status all drive home a message of powerlessness to these workers.27
Even more important than reduced incomes is the grinding insecurity that
low-skilled workers faced even when the economy was strong. Although many have
noted that low-skilled workers’ real wages began to stagnate around 1970, few have
pointed out that the volatility of their incomes began to grow at the same time.28
Years after the recovery had been underway, this dislocation still caused
three-quarters of voters to report that the economy was stagnant or getting worse,
with most reporting that the uncertainty was adversely affecting their family lives.29
Among those making less than $75,000 per year in 2011, one-quarter to one-third
had trouble paying for housing or health care or feared a pay cut or layoff in the
coming year.30 These fears were well-founded: although only 2.7% of the population
was constantly poor during the four years following the Great Recession,31 more
than one-third of the population had a spell of poverty lasting at least two months
during that period.32 Although most recover, that is by no means

21. Id. at 23.
22. Id. at 22–23.
23. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
P60-249, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013 4 (2014) [ hereinafter
DENAVAS-WALT & PROCTOR, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013 ].
24. Id.
25. TAMARA DRAUT, SLEEPING GIANT: HOW THE NEW WORKING CLASS WILL TRANSFORM
AMERICA 21 (2016).
26. Id. at 19–39.
27. Id. at 47–61.
28. Benjamin J. Keys, Trends in Income and Consumption Volatility, 1970-2000, in INCOME
VOLATILITY AND FOOD ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (Dean Jolliffe & James P. Ziliak
eds., 2008).
29. SCHOEN, HOPELESSLY DIVIDED, supra note 19, at 8.
30. Id. at 39.
31. DENAVAS-WALT & PROCTOR, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013,
supra note 23, at 4.
32. Id.
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guaranteed: personal economic crises often lead to long-term poverty.33 Even
relatively short spells of poverty do direct damage to those involved and undermine
their sense of security about the future.
Nor do they have much to look forward to farther down the road. Raising the
retirement age to reduce social insurance outlays and press people to work longer
has long been an article of faith among conservatives and many moderates. Now
influential liberals have taken up the call, even while acknowledging that the
lower-skilled workers that most depend on retirement benefits are also those least
likely to be able to keep working or to find employment if they try.34
Responding to the power of large campaign donors, both political parties
embrace policies that redistribute wealth regressively, to the detriment of
lower-skilled workers clinging to middle-class status.35 Politicians’ measurable
responsiveness to voters’ sentiment has plummeted.36 Polls show large numbers of
voters, often majorities, believing that the U.S. government no longer represents its
people.37 Middle-class voters’ pessimism about the future may be unprecedented in
this country.38
The social costs are enormous. High income inequality correlates with a wide
array of social ills, including homicide rates, teenage birth rates, prison populations,
and substance abuse.39 Even more fundamentally, it leads to loss of faith in
government and the social cohesion that makes a society governable40 and the trust
in financial institutions that allows the economic system to function efficiently.41
Understanding how inequality leads to this decay is, however, crucial. It undermines
the institutions that people depend on in their daily lives: not just workplaces but
also schools, religious congregations, local public services, and ultimately families.42
Alas, our discourse on poverty, and our public programs, are ill-equipped to
recognize the very real suffering of the economically insecure. When we think of
poverty, we imagine a grim, crowded urban ghetto of dilapidated housing and few

33. Hilary W. Hoynes et al., Long Run Impacts of Childhood Access to the Safety Net (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18535, 2012) (finding anti-poverty programs promote
social mobility).
34. ALICIA H. MUNNELL & STEVEN A. SASS, WORKING LONGER: THE SOLUTION TO THE
RETIREMENT INCOME CHALLENGE 145 (2008).
35. SACHS, supra note 13, at 114–15.
36. NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND
UNEQUAL RICHES 172–74 (2006).
37. SCHOEN, HOPELESSLY DIVIDED, supra note 19, at 25–26.
38. Id. at 47.
39. DOUGLAS E. SCHOEN, THE END OF AUTHORITY: HOW A LOSS OF LEGITIMACY AND
BROKEN TRUST ARE ENDANGERING OUR FUTURE 120 (2013); Kate E. Pickett et al., Adolescent Birth
Rates, Total Homicides, and Income Inequality in Rich Countries, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1181 (2005).
40. Pickett et al., supra note 39.
41. Id. at 122.
42. Id. at 121.
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jobs,43 run-down migrant labor camps,44 decaying villages in Appalachia, isolated
settlements on Native American reservations, or shotgun shacks on obscure
backroads in the South.45 A few more sophisticated people may think of declining
inner-ring suburbs and bleak bedroom communities on the edges of our most
affluent metropolitan areas.
Missing from these visions is economic insecurity and its consequence: acute,
or episodic, poverty experienced by individuals and families that were living largely
free of extreme want who are suddenly thrust into poverty because of a plant
closure, an accident, a divorce, or an argument with the boss. Their hardship is very
real, and the harm they suffer may be very long-lasting. Indeed, their nominal
incomes may actually overstate their ability to meet their immediate needs as they
struggle to keep up with monthly obligations assumed during better times.
The large group of economically vulnerable people who usually have incomes
above the poverty line but occasionally face acute economic distress should be a
major focus of political debates and of anti-poverty legislation. Their
needs—short-term purchasing power—should be simpler and less expensive to
meet. Doing so would have the effect of social insurance, with the taxes these
families pay in good times more than sufficient to cover the costs of aid they need
when in distress. And far more than the chronically poor, their loyalties are divided
between the two major political parties.46
Yet serious attention to the plight of the acute poor has been largely absent
from our national discourse about poverty and inequality. Anti-poverty law has
resolutely relied on a two-prong model that assumes people’s economic conditions
are largely static: major social insurance programs serve those permanently unable
to work due to age or disability while means-tested programs make meager
provision for chronically impoverished families. Discussions of economic mobility
tend to assume that people have long been poor and limit their focus to how, after
many years, they finally escaped.47 Occasionally critics of the chronic poor will hold
up the acute poor as a supposed model for emulation.48 At other times, advocates
on one or the other side of debates on the chronic poor will try to push the line
dividing acute from chronic poverty in one direction or the other to make

43. See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR (1996).
44. See, e.g., RONALD B. TAYLOR, SWEATSHOPS IN THE SUN: CHILD LABOR ON THE FARM
(1973).
45. See generally CYNTHIA M. DUNCAN, RURAL POVERTY IN AMERICA (1992).
46. See, e.g., THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? HOW CONSERVATIVES
WON THE HEART OF AMERICA (2004) (describing economically insecure families’ support for
Republicans).
47. See, e.g., KEN AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS 16 (rev. ed. 1999).
48. See, e.g., Mary K. Reinhart, Arizona’s Child-Welfare System Still In Crisis, ARIZ. REPUBLIC
(May 11, 2013, 1:02 AM), http://archive.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/
20121223arizonas-child-welfare-system-still-crisis.html [ https://perma.cc/7BFV-ZL7Y ].
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low-income people look better or worse.49 More recently, critics of the chronic poor
have begun to argue that the acute poor, too, are morally blameworthy and hence
deserve their hardship.50
Thoughtful proposals about how to ameliorate the hardship of the
economically insecure have been rare. In political rhetoric and in the design of our
anti-poverty programs, the two-prong model reigns supreme and the acute poor are
commonly collateral casualties in battles fought over chronic poverty.
The distinction between acute and chronic need has long been familiar in the
context of health care programs. Although acute care services receive most of the
attention, and are typically the prime targets for budget cuts, almost two-thirds of
Medicaid expenditures go for long-term care and services to beneficiaries receiving
such care.51 To keep Medicare (relatively) affordable to the federal government, its
long-term care benefit is designed to exclude those with chronic needs, shifting the
burden to Medicaid (and, in part, to states).52 Some major health care reform
proposals made their budget numbers fit by avoiding, or making impractical
proposals concerning, long-term care;53 even the Affordable Care Act largely left
the rules for providing long-term care as it found them.
That distinction, however, has not penetrated discussions of poverty and
human needs more generally. In particular, this country has paid strikingly little
attention to the tens of millions of people who become poor, often extremely poor,
for discrete periods of time in response to conditions that are unlikely to persist
indefinitely. Although the dividing line between acute and chronic poverty can at
times be difficult to discern precisely—and particularly harsh bouts of acute poverty
can trigger chain reactions that lead to chronic poverty—the acute poor have
distinct sets of characteristics and needs that our policies built for the chronic poor
often address badly, if at all.

49.

See, e.g., MARY JO BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC
(1994).
50. See, e.g., PAUL KERSEY & TIM KANE, HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER
#1754: THE WRONG TIME TO EXTEND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 1 (2004) (decrying UC’s
“perverse incentives” and suggesting that recipients are unlikely to accept work until benefits run out).
51. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAID 3
(2016), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-medicaid_0.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/3BF5-C3Z7 ].
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(2)(A), (f) (2018).
53. Andrew Mollison, Four of 8 Health Reform Plans Rated Favorably, PALM BEACH POST, May
18, 1994, at 13A.
TO REFORM
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Scholarly discourse on poverty overwhelmingly focuses on the chronic poor.
This is true of historical accounts,54 social scientific analyses,55 and case studies.56
Thus, for example, sociologist William Julius Wilson and economist Rebecca Blank
believe that poverty results significantly from economic and demographic upheavals
that have shifted jobs out of the inner cities57 and that increasing the availability of
jobs, childcare, and other subsidies for low-wage workers is crucial.58 Economist
David Ellwood also attributes poverty to broader societal changes, although he
emphasizes family structure more.59 These factors could be seen as increasing the
likelihood of episodes of acute poverty, but discussion focuses largely on the
number of people in chronic poverty.
Ellwood and Blank offer a long list of augmentations to existing programs
keyed to politically popular themes such as rewarding work, collecting child support,
and educating youth as well as transforming urban ghettoes;60 Ellwood emphasizes
that his problem is with the chronic poor by proposing time limits on welfare
(although he would guarantee employment for anyone reaching that time limit).61
Wilson believes that European consensus-based interest-group politics make a
meaningful response to poverty much easier than in the divisive U.S. political
climate but that policy experts can design programs “to which the more advantaged
groups of all races and class backgrounds can positively relate.”62 Ellwood believes
that clever policy experts can design policies that can build a broad consensus by
avoiding the trade-offs that have previously divided us.63 “‘Ending poverty’ is not a
likely outcome in the foreseeable future,” writes Blank, but believes a broad
coalition, spanning all levels of government, the private sector, and conscientious

54. E.g., PETER EDELMAN, SEARCHING FOR AMERICA’S HEART: RFK AND THE RENEWAL
OF HOPE 5-6 (2001); RON HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE (2006); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE
SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986) [ hereinafter
KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE ]; WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO
WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA (5th ed. 1994).
55. E.g., KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS
SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK (1997); HARRY J. HOLZER, WHAT EMPLOYERS
WANT: JOB PROSPECTS FOR LESS-EDUCATED WORKERS (1996); KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO
SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING POOR IN THE INNER CITY (1999); WILSON, supra note 43.
56. E.g., JASON DEPARLE, AMERICAN DREAM: THREE WOMEN, TEN KIDS, AND A NATION’S
DRIVE TO END WELFARE (2004); BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT)
GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001); DAVID ZUCCHINO, MYTH OF THE WELFARE QUEEN: A PULITZER
PRIZE-WINNING JOURNALIST’S PORTRAIT OF WOMEN ON THE LINE (1997).
57. REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING POVERTY
13–82 (1997); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 140–46 (1987).
58. BLANK, supra note 57, at 252–89; WILSON, supra note 57, at 146–59, 163–64.
59. DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY
45–80 (1988).
60. BLANK, supra note 57, at 252–89; ELLWOOD, supra note 59, at 104–27, 155–85, 220–30.
61. ELLWOOD, supra note 59, at 178–83.
62. WILSON, supra note 57, at 155–63.
63. ELLWOOD, supra note 59, at 242–43.
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individuals, can make progress.64 Law professor Peter Edelman decries the
simplistic view most Americans have of poverty—neglecting in particular
concentrated poverty and deep poverty—but remains very much within the chronic
poverty frame.65
The same obsession with the chronic poor is evident on the ideological right.
Political scientist Charles Murray and journalist Marvin Olasky tell us that a lack of
moral character is the driving cause of poverty.66 Political scientist Lawrence Mead
and economist Martin Anderson focus on what they see as a lack of work effort,67
perhaps the result of psychological deficiencies68 or insufficient incentives.69
Murray believes that abolishing federal and state anti-poverty programs is the
solution70 and bemoans the sentimentality and bad social science that he says hold
us back from dropping the ax.71 Olasky argues that reducing aid to the poor and
heavily conditioning what remained would correct that moral decline72 and that
liberals’ alienation from the actual circumstances of the poor cause them to block
these reforms.73 Mead would like to see strict work and other conduct requirements
for the poor74 but believes liberals will never agree to the details required to make
that happen.75 Anderson proposes similar behavioral requirements as well as
numerous changes to existing programs that would seek to limit aid to those most
clearly unable to support themselves;76 he blames the failure to adopt such a plan
on advocates of a guaranteed minimum income entrenched in “strategic positions
in government, the media, and academia” but believes bold national leadership
could overcome them.77
Some proposals on the left might have somewhat greater impact on the acute
poor, but even that benefit seems largely incidental to their focus on the chronic
poor. Law professors Joel Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld reject morality-based
explanations for poverty78 in favor of the conclusion that poverty results primarily

64.
65.

BLANK, supra note 57, at 292–93.
PETER EDELMAN, SO RICH, SO POOR: WHY IT’S SO HARD TO END POVERTY IN
AMERICA (2012).
66. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 154–66 (1984); MARVIN OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY
OF AMERICAN COMPASSION 116–50 (1992).
67. MARTIN ANDERSON, WELFARE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM IN
THE UNITED STATES 87–123 (1978); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY
48–63 (1992).
68. MEAD, supra note 67, at 12.
69. ANDERSON, supra note 67, at 43–56.
70. MURRAY, supra note 66, at 196–218.
71. Id. at 219–36.
72. OLASKY, supra note 66, at 149–50.
73. Id. at 176–94.
74. MEAD, supra note 67, at 206–09.
75. Id. at 251–54.
76. ANDERSON, supra note 67, at 153–65.
77. Id. at 167.
78. JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY
& WELFARE 204 (1997).
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from “the deterioration of the low-wage labor market,”79 find the solution in
numerous modifications of existing social welfare programs to increase subsidies to
the working poor,80 and believe that forthright discussion of “major income
redistribution” can make this possible.81 Sociologists Frances Fox Piven and
Richard Cloward go further, arguing that poverty is the result of deliberate choices
to discipline the workforce.82 They would solve the problem with economic policies
pushing the economy toward full employment or, failing that, through broad
expansion of the welfare rolls,83 which they hold is possible through organizing.84
Michael Harrington attributed poverty to isolation, sometimes physical but almost
always social.85 He urged a combination of enthusiastic engagement with the poor,
heavy federal spending to replace slums with good housing, and eradication of
racism,86 and he hoped to achieve that with a “crusade”87 to end the poor’s isolation
so that the affluent can no longer ignore their plight.88 All of these are
overwhelmingly prescriptions for the chronic poor alone.
Two groups of people exist in the space between the persistently poor and the
economically secure: the stable near-poor and those subject to occasional bouts of
acute poverty. Over the course of a few years, the total incomes of a stable
near-poor family and a more comfortable family suffering a bout of acute poverty
may be quite similar. Yet our public policies treat the two quite differently.
The stable near-poor are eligible for quite a range of transfer programs. SNAP
eligibility extends to 130% of the federal poverty income guidelines.89 Pregnant
women and young children have long been eligible for Medicaid at even higher
levels.90 Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility for certain families
containing multiple children with severe disabilities also continues well above the
poverty line.91 The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) can extend past twice the
poverty line.92 Housing programs, too, have had their eligibility limits raised well

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 213–24.
Id. at 224–25.
FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 34–38 (1971).
83. Id. at 345–48.
84. Id. at 330–38.
85. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
86–87 (1962).
86. Id. at 176–84.
87. Id. at 176.
88. Id. at 167–68.
89. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c)(2) (2018).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(l) (2018).
91. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1165 (2018) (establishing rules for counting parental income that can
result in some families getting partial benefits well above the poverty income level).
92. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, CHART BOOK: THE EARNED INCOME TAX
CREDIT AND CHILD TAX CREDIT 7 (2016), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/17-15tax-chartbook.pdf [ https://perma.cc/UPX5-Y8LZ ].
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above the poverty line in most of the country.93 The acute poor, by contrast, are
commonly unable to qualify for benefits through a combination of deliberate and
accidental policies.
Understanding our treatment of the acute poor is important in its own right.
They experience a great deal of preventable hardship. Alleviating that hardship
should be relatively affordable fiscally, and the greater sympathy they enjoy across
much of the political spectrum should immunize such initiatives from the worst of
the vitriol often directed at efforts to combat chronic poverty. Improving treatment
of the acute poor ought to be as close to “low-hanging fruit” as the world of
anti-poverty policy has to offer. The coronavirus pandemic and resulting recession
are highlighting the suffering of many of the acutely poor while laying bare the
extent of their economic insecurity even before the crisis.
Understanding the treatment of the acute poor also provides valuable insights
into how we treat the chronic poor—and why we do so. Many of the acute poor’s
difficulties result from displaced hostility to the chronic poor. Conversely,
middle-class voters may recognize the unfairness of rules denying aid to the chronic
poor more easily when they see those rules’ impact on the acute poor.
The habit of equating income with class breaks down with respect to the acute
poor, whose incomes may be low but whose experiences and attitudes may be much
more middle-class. Seeing income and class separately should yield important
insights: if we are generous with the more middle-class acute poor, then we can
more plausibly see this country’s harsh treatment of the chronic poor as reflecting
class antagonism (and the electorate’s hostility toward the behaviors it has been told
predominate among low-class chronic poor people). If, on the other hand, we are
comparably harsh to the acute and chronic poor, we must face the fact that we are
not as generous a nation as we like to claim.
Politically, the acute poor provide a natural social and political bridge between
the chronic poor and middle-class voters. Having experienced something more
similar to chronic poverty than most of their middle- and upper-income friends can
readily imagine, they have the potential to be voices of tolerance and empathy, just
as friends and relatives of openly lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer
people have helped radically reduce homophobia in U.S. society over the course of
just a couple of decades.
In the broader political arena, sympathy for the acute poor can leaven our
treatment of the chronic poor. Just as Professor Derrick Bell argued that people of
color’s interests advance best when those interests coincide best with those of white
people, low-income people’s interests advance best when aligned with those of

93. See BARRY L. STEFFEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., WORST CASE
HOUSING NEEDS: 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS 3, 63 (2015) (explaining that 30% of area median
income is typically below the federal poverty income guideline, with most housing aid programs
granting eligibility well above that level).
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middle-class voters.94 The seeming otherness of beneficiaries of social welfare
programs has repeatedly undermined them politically. Most dramatically, after
President Reagan removed many of the working poor from food stamps and
particularly AFDC by arguing that aid should target the “truly needy,” House
Speaker Newt Gingrich successfully cited the absence of working recipients as
evidence that AFDC was feeding social pathology and should be
eliminated altogether.
One approach to this historically has been promoting universal (i.e.,
non-means-tested) social insurance programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and
unemployment compensation (UC). In theory, acute poverty ought to be an event
that is highly susceptible to insurance, perhaps even more easily than chronic
poverty due to old-age or disability. This country, however, has long been
ambivalent about social insurance.95 We still have no recovered from the folly of
making employers primarily responsible for providing health insurance, and we have
extended the same privatizing impulse to several key causes of acute poverty.96
Workers’ compensation and UC are both employer-funded on terms that give
employers strong incentives to lobby for more restrictive coverage. Yet despite the
presence of insurance schemes nominally covering two of the most sympathetic
causes of acute poverty—workplace injuries and faultless layoffs—gathering
support for a social insurance program for other causes, or a generic one that
transcends particular causes, has proven impossible.97 Indeed, even those two
programs face increasing attacks. 98
Another response of anti-poverty advocates has been to expand universal
transfer programs that are not regarded as social insurance, such as school meals
and the child tax credit (a modest U.S. analogue to the children’s allowance in some

94. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). But see Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 149 (2015) (acknowledging convergence theory’s contributions but finding significant
analytical flaws in its treatment of race relations).
95. A quarter-century ago, Gøsta Esping-Andersen suggested a useful typology of social welfare
systems. Each of these grew, in different ways, out of primitive poor relief programs. The United States
adheres to the liberal model, characterized by relatively weak universal programs and strong reliance on
means-tested public benefits closely controlled to minimize adverse effects on market discipline.
GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 26–29 (1990). The
other two models, corporatist and social democratic, predominate in Europe, worry far less about
disrupting markets, and provide much more robust universal social rights and benefits. Id. When
someone becomes acutely poor in such a society, many more of her or his basic needs are likely covered
by social insurance, reducing both hardship and social disruption.
96. See David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393 (2008)
(dissecting the impulses behind the calls for human services privatization).
97. Bernie D. Jones, Privately Funded Family Medical Leave?, 35 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 119 (2014)
(discussing failure to win paid leave for workers responding to family emergencies).
98. See, e.g., The Associated Press, Gov. Rick Snyder Signs Bills Lowering Worker Benefits, Costs,
MLIVE (Dec. 20, 2011), https://www.mlive.com/politics/2011/12/gov_rick_snyder_signs_bills_lo.h
tml [ https://perma.cc/FH2C-NSTF ].
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European countries).99 But serving the entire population is extremely expensive, and
for most potential improvements in human services the political drag that higher
cost brings more than offsets any broadened support. Serving the acute poor in
programs that primarily benefit the chronic poor, by contrast, is much more
affordable while still offering opportunities to burnish the program’s image with
middle-class voters.
The coronavirus pandemic has painfully laid bare this country’s failure to
develop effective means of aiding the acute poor. Tens of millions of people who
thought themselves to be economically stable in January are suddenly destitute in
April.100 Some conservatives insisted on seeing response to the pandemic through
the incentive-based lens that dominates policy on chronic poverty: even as
governors were asking non-essential businesses to close and workers to stay home,
they told Congress “[d]on’t expand welfare and other income redistribution benefits
like paid leave and unemployment benefits that will inhibit growth and
discourage work.”101
Even when a consensus formed to help the newly unemployed, it found the
available programs ill-suited to the task. Congress suspended the three-month time
limit on unemployed people’s eligibility for food assistance,102 but with many
intermittent workers having already been terminated from the program it is unclear
how many would realize that they were again eligible. Congress increased
unemployment compensation benefits and broadened eligibility to include many
workers in the “gig economy,”103 but insufficient agency staffing,104 prior efforts to
make benefits less accessible,105 and the requirement that recipients be actively
seeking work106 threatened to leave many of the newly unemployed destitute. And

99. See ALFRED J. KAHN & SHEILA B. KAMERMAN, NOT FOR THE POOR ALONE: EUROPEAN
SOCIAL SERVICES (1975).
100. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, STATES START GRAPPLING WITH HIT TO
TAX COLLECTIONS (2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-2-20sfp.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/5V3V-T6G3 ].
101. Amanda Terkel, Conservatives Worry Too Much Coronavirus Relief Will Make People Lazy,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ron-johnson-coronavirusrelief_n_5e710d60c5b60fb69ddf3bf1 [ https://perma.cc/9UZG-42NK ].
102. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 2301, 134 Stat. 178
(2020) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2011 note).
103. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 2102–2116
(2020) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
104. See, e.g., William Sanders, State Working Through Backlog of Unemployment Claims,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Mar. 28, 2020, 2:56 PM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/
2020/mar/28/state-working-through-backlog-unemployment-claims/?news-arkansas
[ https://
perma.cc/75LE-PGHJ ].
105. Gary Fineout & Marc Caputo, Republicans Rage as Florida Becomes a Nightmare for Trump,
POLITICO (Apr. 3, 2020, 5:02 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2020/04/03/itsa-sh-sandwich-republicans-rage-as-florida-becomes-a-nightmare-for-trump-1271172 [ https://
perma.cc/J94N-BM24 ].
106. See Ryan Suppe, Dept. of Labor: Unemployment Claims Up 1,200%, Largest One-Week
Increase Ever, POST REGISTER (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.postregister.com/coronavirus/dept-of-
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when Congress provided for emergency relief checks to tide the newly unemployed
through the period of social distancing, it based eligibility on income for 2018 or
2019, which may have borne little resemblance to workers’ current circumstances.107
Although some states reopened health care plan enrollment,108 the federal
government declined to do so109 in the majority of the country where it operates
health care exchanges.110 This developing tragedy demonstrates that the country
possesses neither the conceptual nor the institutional tools to address acute
poverty effectively.
This Article explores how the two-prong model of anti-poverty law fails the
acute poor. Part I surveys the surprisingly sparse information we have about acute
poverty, including its causes, its extent, the ways in which the acute poor diverge
from images we have of the chronic poor, and our political system’s complex and
inconsistent reaction to acute poverty. Ironically, by excluding the economically
insecure from both social insurance and means-tested programs, we have narrowed
those programs’ political support, leaving them highly vulnerable. Part II shows
how the dominant model of anti-poverty law fails the acute poor, sometimes by
design and sometimes by indifference. It also describes pending proposals that
would double down on those failures. Part III explores what principles ought to
guide a more robust response to acute poverty. In concluding, the Article briefly
considers how addressing acute poverty fits into the broader concerns about
social justice.
This Article does not contend that the problems of the acute poor are more
severe, or deserving of greater sympathy, than those of the chronic poor. Copious
research demonstrates that the ill effects of poverty are cumulative, and as traumatic
as the acute poor’s descent into poverty will be, the chronic poor have experienced
that and much more already. The suffering of the acute poor, however, is real, is
serious, and is deserving of the attention of compassionate people. Moreover, in the
odd mix of power politics, symbolic politics, and sympathy politics that shapes this
country’s anti-poverty policy,111 a broader understanding of the acute poor’s travails

labor-unemployment-claims-up-largest-one-week-increase/article_cc71c0e6-101e-520f-87ca30439185ccdc.html [ https://perma.cc/Q6TG-4L42 ].
107. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act § 2301.
108. Mary Ellen McIntire & Lauren Clason, States Reopen Insurance Enrollment as Coronavirus
Spreads, ROLL CALL (Mar. 13, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/03/13/states-reopeninsurance-enrollment-as-coronavirus-spreads/ [ https://perma.cc/VBU3-MQKP ].
109. Susannah Luthi, Trump Rejects Obamacare Special Enrollment Period Amid Pandemic,
POLITICO
(Mar. 31, 2020, 6:11 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/31/trumpobamacare-coronavirus-157788 [ https://perma.cc/WK5X-34Q9 ].
110. Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, State-Based Exchanges, CMS.GOV,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/state-marketplaces
[ https://perma.cc/8SAC-E4H3 ] ( last visited April 2, 2020 ) (reporting that in November 2019, the
federal government operated health insurance exchanges for thirty-two states).
111. See David A. Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, 123 YALE L.J. 2806 (2014)
(arguing that low-income people are rarely effective participants in power politics and depend on the
ethical sensibility of a handful of officials across the ideological spectrum).
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can both undermine toxic symbolism and broaden the sympathy needed to improve
programs’ treatment of all low-income people.
I. UNDERSTANDING ACUTE POVERTY
Social policy focuses heavily on individuals and families with incomes so low
that they consistently have difficulty obtaining life’s basic necessities. On the other
hand, policymakers are comfortable setting aside those with incomes providing
consistent security. Between these two groups lie two other sets of people. One
group—those with stable incomes modestly above the poverty line, the stable
near-poor—get significant attention. They may receive reduced-price school meals,
modest earned income tax credits, limited subsidies to help them purchase health
insurance, and other partial benefits. The other group—those that are usually
somewhat above the poverty line but occasionally suffer serious reverses—is all but
invisible. At most, they may be mistaken for the comfortable when their incomes
are high and for the chronic poor when their incomes are low, but their
circumstances and needs are quite different from both of these groups.
This Part seeks better to understand the acute poor, particularly during their
times of need.
A. The Extent of Acute Poverty
Because social scientists overwhelmingly have focused on the chronic poor,
remarkably little useful data exists on the acute poor. Their presence was known
anecdotally and could be inferred from the relatively low median spells of
participation in cash assistance programs and SNAP.112 “Relatively few families are
immune to the possibility and economic consequences of a bout of unemployment
or the departure of death of a spouse.”113 Acute poverty is disproportionately high
in the U.S. compared with other affluent nations.114
A simplistic measure of the extent of acute poverty would be to compare the
number of people the Census Bureau reports to be living below the poverty line in
the peak year of an economic expansion with the number in annual poverty once
the ensuing recession has had its full effect. Thus, the 36.5 million poor people in
2006 had risen to 46.3 million by 2010.115 Controlling for population growth, the

112. See JOSHUA LEFTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AG-3198-C-13-0007, DYNAMICS OF
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PARTICIPATION FROM 2008 TO 2012, at 152
(2014) (finding median spell of participation at twelve months, with shorter medians for households
not containing elderly members or persons with disabilities).
113. Greg J. Duncan et al., Poverty and Social Assistance Dynamics in the United States, Canada,
and Europe, in POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL POLICY: WESTERN STATES AND
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 88 (Katherine McFate et al. eds., 1995).
114. Markus Jäntti, Mobility in the United States in Comparative Perspective, in CHANGING
POVERTY, CHANGING POLICIES 186–87 (Maria Cancian & Sheldon Danziger eds., 2009).
115. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
P60-252, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014, at 12 fig.4 (2015) [DENAVAS-WALT
& PROCTOR, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014].
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number of people living in poverty in 2010 was 8.7 million greater than it would
have been had the poverty rate remained what it was in 2006.
This measure is flawed in several respects. Most obviously, it only addresses
one of many causes of acute poverty, albeit an important one. It says nothing about
acute poverty brought on by natural disasters, by economic changes not tied to the
national business cycle, or by personal calamities. It also says nothing about the
duration of the spells of poverty experienced in either group: someone living at
almost twice the poverty line for half the year and having no income at all for the
other half is indistinguishable from someone with a steady income just below the
poverty line for the entire year. If one believes that these two experiences are likely
to be quite different and to call for different public policy responses, one needs a
measure that differentiates between the two. In addition, the same triggers, such as
a recession, can cause some people to experience acute poverty while launching
others into spells of chronic poverty. In part because of this, the poverty rate often
continues to rise a year or more after a recession has officially ended and then
declines more slowly than unemployment and other measures of
economic distress.116
More insight is available from studies comparing the number of people below
the poverty line for a single year with those that have multi-year spells of poverty.
Several studies have found that the number of people experiencing at least one year
of poverty over a several-year period is several times the number consistently poor
during that period.117 Nonetheless, acute poverty commonly recurs across
someone’s lifetime. More than three-quarters of those experiencing one year of
poverty will experience another at some point in their lives; half will experience five
or more such years.118
Indeed, a study of a representative sample of adults during the years of 1968
through 1992 found that more than half had lived below the poverty line for at least
one year.119 Almost 85% of African-Americans have spent at least one year in
poverty before they reach age sixty-five.120 With so many people experiencing
poverty, we should seek to learn how frequent such bouts of poverty are at any
given time.
Yet people do not eat, meet rent or mortgage obligations, or pay utility bills
annually. Spells of poverty that do not last long enough to pull them below the
poverty line for an entire year may nonetheless be quite devastating. The Census
Bureau recently has begun releasing tables on individuals and families that were

116. See id.
117. Sara Kimberlin & Jill Duerr Berrick, Poor for How Long? Chronic Versus Transient Child
Poverty in the Unites States, in THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS INTO CHILD AND FAMILY
POVERTY 143 (Elizabeth Fernandez et al. eds., 2015).
118. MARK ROBERT RANK, ONE NATION, UNDERPRIVILEGED: WHY AMERICAN POVERTY
AFFECTS US ALL 92–95 (2004).
119. Kimberlin & Berrick, supra note 117, at 142–43.
120. Id.

First to Printer_Super.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

5/26/20 6:12 PM

ACUTE POVERTY

1291

poor for periods of two months or more to complement its traditional presentations
of families that were in poverty over an entire year.121 Comparing these two groups
is problematic: the chronic poor are among those with spells of at least two months,
and some of the acute poor have their incomes drop far enough and long enough
to fall beneath the poverty line for an entire year. Nonetheless, the differences
between these two groups are instructive. Between 2009 and 2011, some 89.6
million people suffered at least one episode of poverty lasting two months or more.
That is more than twice the average 40.5 million the same survey recorded as living
below the poverty line on an annual basis during that period.122 More than
one-quarter of those who were poor during the first month of the period were poor
for the entire thirty-six months, yet these constituted only 11% of the total number
experiencing poverty for at least two months during the three years.123
Acute poverty can be transitory indeed. More than half of all bouts of poverty
last four months or less.124 Almost four out of five bouts have ended within
a year.125
Of course, not all people who become acutely poor will do so with the same
frequency or for the same periods of time. In addition to being much less likely to
experience poverty in their first ten years of life, white children who do become
poor are far more likely than children of color to experience no more than three
years of poverty during that time.126 Among those in poverty, a far higher
proportion of whites are acutely poor relative to African-Americans.127 More
broadly, the acutely poor’s characteristics are far more like those of the
general population.128
Research comparing those below the poverty line for at least two months
during the boom years of 1996 to 1999 with those that were poor for all months
during those years is instructive. The former group was predominately the acute;
the latter were solely the chronic poor.129 Among the total group, the poverty rate
121. ASHLEY N. EDWARDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P70-137, DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC
WELL-BEING: POVERTY, 2009–2011 (2014).
122. The official estimate of persons living in poverty each year is derived from the Census
Bureau’s Current Population Survey, which collects only annual data. See DENAVAS-WALT
& PROCTOR, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014, supra note 115, at 1. To determine
how many were poor for shorter periods, the Census Bureau relied on its Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP), which returns to the same families for updates each month. See id. The
difference between the two surveys accounts for the modest differences in estimates of the number of
people living in annual poverty.
123. EDWARDS, supra note 121.
124. Jäntti, supra note 114, at 185 fig.7.1.
125. Id.
126. William H. Scarborough, Who Are the Poor? A Demographic Perspective, in CHILD
POVERTY AND PUBLIC POLICY 82 fig.3.4 ( Judith A. Chafel ed., 1993).
127. GREG J. DUNCAN, YEARS OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY 48–52 (1984).
128. Id. at 48–49.
129. Some 19.5% of the total population was poor for at least two months during those four
years; only 2.0% were poor for all of those months. Thus, the latter group was barely one-tenth of the
former. Jäntti, supra note 114, at 183 tbl.7.2. To be sure, a substantial number of the chronic poor have
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among people of color was about two-and-a-half times that of non-Hispanic whites,
but more than five times as many African-Americans and Latinos/Latinas were
chronically poor.130 The rate at which suburbanites experienced acute poverty was
modestly lower than the national average, while the rate at which they experienced
chronic poverty was just over half of the overall average.131 Working age people
experience acute poverty at a rate close to the national average but are much less
likely to experience chronic poverty.132 Married couples experience about two-third
the national rate of acute poverty but less than one-third the rate of acute poverty.133
B. The Causes and Nature of Acute Poverty
The federal poverty level today is derived from a measure of the cost of food
half a century ago and adjusted for inflation. It has long been subject to harsh
criticism, including from the Census Bureau itself, for inadequately measuring the
extent of hardship experienced by financially pressed families.134 A major study by
the National Academy of Sciences urged that the measure take into account both
non-cash benefits, such as federal food and housing assistance, and the actual
expenses low-income households are likely to face.135 Applying this same
principle—that poverty is the result of a mismatch between practically inescapable
expenses and household income—would suggest that families with incomes well
above the poverty line that suffer unusually heavy expenses should be considered
poor. Thus, those facing sudden, expensive medical crises or the need to replace a
vehicle depended upon to commute to work and obtain basic necessities might be
acutely poor. For the most part, however, anti-poverty programs make little
allowance for the effects of such expenses on claimants’ ability to afford the
basic necessities.
On the other hand, those with substantial assets may not experience hardship
during gaps in their incomes, even if their expenses rise. Donald Trump, for
example, is showing no distress despite his sharply negative cash flow as he runs for
president. Anti-poverty programs generally take one of two extreme approaches to
assets: either ignoring them altogether for administrative simplicity or disqualifying
claimants completely based on possession of relatively paltry levels of assets.
Even defining poverty solely as a shortage of income, however, a very large
number of otherwise middle-income families experience bouts of acute poverty

an occasional month above the poverty line and would not be in the latter group, but the acute poor
still heavily outnumber the chronic poor and hence overwhelmingly determine the characteristics of the
former group.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., KATHLEEN SHORT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-251, THE SUPPLEMENTAL
POVERTY MEASURE: 2013, at 1 (2014); DUNCAN, supra note 127, at 36–37.
135. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH (Constance
F. Citro & Robert T. Michael eds., National Academy Press 1995).
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during the course of a year, with many more doing so at least once within a span of
a few years. And many of these families lack the assets to tide them over without
material hardship and loss of security.136
1. Triggers of Acute Poverty
Individuals and families fall into acute poverty for a wide range of reasons,
from the highly specific to the broadly systemic. The cause of a bout of poverty
often has a significant effect on how policymakers and the general public view it
and on the availability of anti-poverty programs to ease the hardship.
a. Mass Disasters
The most visible cause of acute poverty is a mass disaster. This could be a
major natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina, massive regional flooding, or a
powerful earthquake. It also could be an economic disaster, typically a recession.
The coronavirus pandemic is simultaneously an extreme mass casualty event with
staggering direct costs and an extreme economic downturn. And, in the future, we
may expect to see more environmental disasters, such as the BP oil spill in the Gulf
of Mexico or various effects of climate change. These events disrupt economic
activity over a wide area, destroying the means of production or forcing workers to
relocate away from it.
Initially, the public tends to feel strong empathy for disaster victims. Fairly
rapidly, however, the public’s attention wanders off. Indeed, before very long the
once-fawning news media starts to run stories casting the acute poor in a bad
light: looters in disaster areas (who almost always turn out not to be from the
affected area), homeowners or farmers facing dispossession who had vastly
over-extended themselves financially, discouraged workers no longer seeking
employment, and the like. The public then becomes impatient with the acute poor
for not getting back on their feet more expeditiously. As the old political cartoon
says, 8% unemployment is acceptable to 92% of workers.
b. Localized Disasters
Many natural disasters too small to garner national attention nonetheless can
do considerable damage in a local area. Even if tornados have far less destructive
power than hurricanes, if they knock out major local employers, they can still cause
a sharp rise in acute poverty among the displaced workers and those that depend
on them. When those workers stop spending, local retailers and service providers
lay off their own employees, compounding the problem. Floods that destroy
housing may force their residents to move away from their jobs for long enough to
lose them.

136.

Jäntti, supra note 114, at 181.

First to Printer_Super.docx (Do Not Delete)

1294

5/26/20 6:12 PM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:1273

Similarly, even when the national economy seems to be doing quite well,
particular employers may encounter financial problems and have to close or shed
workers. Others may merge with competitors and lay off newly redundant workers
or move to other parts of the country or overseas. Where the employer dominates
a particular community’s labor market, the result may be chronic poverty until a
replacement employer arrives or enough laid-off workers move to other areas. But
even in areas with more robust employment markets, several months of poverty
may result before the worker gets re-employed.
Here, too, disasters can beget more disasters. The Great Recession was caused
by problems in the housing market but then exacerbated those problems as laid-off
workers were unable to keep up payments on their mortgages. At the time,
conventional wisdom was that the nation had a glut of housing, with property values
dropping precipitously as a huge bubble deflated. With so many homes becoming
vacant at a time when few families had the financial latitude to buy, foreclosing
lenders needed to convert that housing to rentals quickly to prevent its decay. In
many parts of the country with high rates of foreclosures, lenders failed to rise to
that challenge and allowed much of their foreclosed inventory to fall out of the
housing market. Increasing household formation with the recovering economy and
natural population growth has outstripped new construction and the return of
foreclosed houses to the market. As a result, a number of areas now have sharply
rising rents for low- and modest-cost housing.137
c. Individual Causes
Although major, attention-grabbing social disasters cause considerable acute
poverty, by far, the majority of instances have much more individualistic causes.
Illnesses and injuries temporarily prevent people from working. Family members’
illnesses or injuries, or the disappearance or incapacitation of other caregivers, force
workers to leave jobs. So do collapses in childcare arrangements or breakdowns of
vehicles or carpools relied upon to get to work. Workers are fired or laid off and
are part of the large and growing segment of the jobless that the unemployment
compensation system does not cover.
Domestic violence can often cause acute poverty.138 Whether a
violence-driven break-up leaves the family in chronic poverty—or results in a cycle
of reunions and splits with repeated episodes of acute poverty—often depends on
the availability of supports for the survivor.139 That being said, although politicians
and social scientists emphasize family break-ups as a cause of poverty, data suggests

137. ALLISON
CHARETTE
ET
AL.,
JOINT
CTR.
FOR
HOUS.
STUDIES
& ENTER. CMTY. PARTNERS, PROJECTING TRENDS IN SEVERELY COST-BURDENED
RENTERS: 2015–2025 (2015).
138. See Christine C. George, Welfare Reform and the Safety Needs of Battered Women, in THE
PROMISE OF WELFARE REFORM: POLITICAL RHETORIC AND THE REALITY OF POVERTY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 193, 193–95 (Keith M. Kilty & Elizabeth A. Segal eds., 2006).
139. Id. at 195–98.
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that some families composed of adults with limited skills would have been poor
even had they stayed together.140
Involvements with the criminal justice system or immigration enforcement
may cause a worker to be incarcerated long enough to lose employment, even if the
ultimate resolution is favorable. The stigma of having been locked up also can
complicate finding replacement employment or force the worker to take a job
paying less than she or he was accustomed to making. Relatives of someone arrested
may see their finances disrupted when they post bail, contract on abusive terms
with a private bail-bond company to do so,141 or travel to distant facilities for visits.
Family financial crises can start a self-reinforcing downward spiral. When the
sudden need to repair a home, or to pay a medical debt, strains the family’s
resources, it may be unable to pay timely for childcare or routine car repair, causing
a sudden inability to attend work. Family financial crises also can result in evictions,
absorb a worker’s attention and possibly land the family much farther from her or
his job. When a shock to the family’s finances results in a utility shut-off, the worker
may be unable to maintain the personal appearance her or his employer demands.
2. How the Acute Poor Are Different
The acute poor are a large and diverse group—as, indeed, are the chronic poor.
Identifying systematic differences between the two groups therefore is inherently
problematic. Nonetheless, the acute poor are more likely to have certain
characteristics than are the chronic poor. These characteristics may have important
policy consequences for the design and administration of anti-poverty programs.
These
differences
also,
as
discussed
below,
have
important
142
political consequences.
First, the circumstances of the acute poor are likely to be more volatile. They
have already suffered a change for the worse; many are likely to be able to reverse
that misfortune relatively soon while others may slip further into poverty. This
volatility makes determinations of need based on information from earlier periods
highly problematic: the challenges they are suffering today may not have begun to
manifest then, and by the time some programs register their current hardships they
may no longer need aid.
Second, they are likely to have far less experience coping both with poverty
and with the bureaucracy administering government aid programs than the chronic
poor. This inexperience, or excessive optimism about the speed with which they
will return to relative prosperity, may cause them to make serious mistakes
compounding their problems, such as failing to curtail spending sufficiently rapidly
140. Mary Jo Bane, Politics and Policies of the Feminization of Poverty, in THE POLITICS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 381, 384 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988).
141. See Shaila Dewan, Court by Court, Lawyers Fight Policies That Fall Heavily on the Poor,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/us/court-by-court-lawyers-fightpractices-that-punish-the-poor.html [ https://perma.cc/G36U-NBHM ].
142. See infra Section I.D.

First to Printer_Super.docx (Do Not Delete)

1296

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

5/26/20 6:12 PM

[Vol. 10:1273

or paying bills that are not tied to basic necessities. Administrative processes, too,
that largely work for the chronic poor—not because those processes are clear but
just because they are familiar—may lead to high rates of procedural denials when
applied to the acute poor.
Third, income-based measures of need may produce less precise measures of
their circumstances. The chronic poor are likely to have long-ago exhausted reserves
of spare food and wearable clothing, as well as the patience of creditors and the
generosity of friends and family. For them, income directly determines what they
may consume. Acutely poor individuals may be in a similar position—or may have
significant reserves left to tap. Similarly, the acute poor may be contractually
committed to relatively high monthly expenses—mortgage and car payments,
cellphone and cable contracts, credit card debt, etc.—that sharply restrict the share
of their incomes that are genuinely disposable while doing little to ameliorate
their hardship.
Fourth, they commonly are spending substantial amounts of their time seeking
both to ameliorate their conditions and to regain the level of income they previously
enjoyed. Researching possible jobs, applying, and interviewing can consume a great
deal of time and reduce their scheduling flexibility.
Fifth, the acute poor may resemble the non-poor more than they do the
chronic poor both socially and vocationally. They are less likely to live in areas of
concentrated poverty, they are more likely to have friends and close relatives living
well above the poverty line, and they are more likely to have strong connections to
the labor force. Of those poor for at least two months during 2009–2011, 53% were
non-Hispanic whites compared with just 43% for the annual poor.143 Some 62% of
the two-month poor were of working age compared with 57% of the annually poor.
The acute poor appear to be significantly better educated: when more of the acute
poor are included, 34% have attended at least one year of college compared with
just 25% of the annual poor. The broader group is somewhat more likely to be male,
to live in a metropolitan area, and to have no disabilities affecting their ability to
work. Some 27% of the larger group are married compared with 19% of the annual
poor. And 47% of the larger group are employed (with 23% working full-time)
compared with less than half as many among the annual poor. Other studies have
confirmed that the chronic poor are more likely to be non-white, to have a head of
household with a disability and without a high school diploma, and to live in a
female-headed family with children.144
Finally, the acute poor commonly do not know when or whether they will
return to their former circumstances. Many of the chronic poor, by contrast, assume
that their circumstances will not improve significantly in the foreseeable future and
tend to plan accordingly. The acute poor’s uncertainty about their prospects can
cause them to make important mistakes, compounding their hardship. If they

143.
144.

EDWARDS, supra note 121, at 21 tbl.A-4, 19 tbl.A-2.
Kimberlin & Berrick, supra note 117, at 144–50.
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believe their poverty will be brief, they may take on large amounts of debt to tide
themselves over. Should their optimism prove unfounded, they will face heavy debt
service payments and a declining credit rating, which may adversely affect their
ability to secure employment. Similarly, if they lean heavily on friends and family in
the beginning, they may alienate and lose those resources should their hardship last
longer than expected. If, however, they assume their reverse will be protracted, they
may seek to “cut their losses” by giving up on homes in which they have substantial
equity, suffering severe losses. Overestimating the severity of their predicament also
could cause them to seize a low-paying position and lock themselves into a lower
long-term earnings path.
C. The Consequences of Acute Poverty
Although much has been written about the many and severe harms resulting
from grinding chronic poverty, the harms of acute poverty have been far less
carefully studied. To the extent the acute poor are considered at all, they are
imagined to be a milder form of those suffered by the chronic poor. Some of the
consequences of acute poverty do indeed resemble those that the chronic poor
experience, although they are not necessarily distinguishable as milder. Others are
distinctive results of the rapid fall from a different socioeconomic position.
The broader social harms of geographically concentrated chronic policy also
are widely recognized. Temporal concentrations of acute poverty also can cause
serious damage to important public policies.
1. Individualized Harms
Anyone with humanitarian concerns about the effects of poverty should care
deeply about the acutely poor. Although its duration may make it appear far less
harmful than chronic poverty, being thrust into poverty and powerlessness is a
wrenching, traumatic experience likely to cause harm persisting long after the
episode has passed.
a. Economic Waste
Sudden descents into poverty are likely to cause significant economic waste.
Thus, the actual hardship resulting from an individual or family’s fall into poverty
may be inadequately captured by the drop in income. Acute poverty can convert the
life of an individual or family into one large fire sale.
Most items that the family might own—its home, motor vehicles, clothes, and
other household goods—will sell for only a fraction of what they cost the
household. The same is true of small businesses lost in a recession or natural disaster
and of vehicles and other items household members ordinarily rely upon to make a
living. Moreover, large amounts of personal property commonly are lost or
damaged when a family is evicted or must move hurriedly. Acute poverty also can
temporarily drive up the value of an individual’s time as she or he desperately seeks
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the means to eat and to stave off eviction or utility shut-offs; this can drive choices
that sacrifice long-term well-being, such as dropping out of training programs or
missing time at a job that values attendance as a criteria for promotion. Finally, the
acute poor may feel obliged to seek credit, which is commonly offered to them at
effective interest rates that all but assure large debt service payments that squeeze
out basic needs while failing to prevent the ultimate repossession of
its collateral.
As a result, a family that spends most of its time at twice the poverty line but
suffers occasional periods at half of the poverty line may have trouble maintaining
the array of personal property that a stable near-poor family living can. Even
without any redistribution across the income spectrum, a system that taxed such a
family while it was in its usual, relatively solvent, condition to pay for benefits to
cushion its fall during the periods of deprivation would enhance its
welfare dramatically.
b. Physical Harms
A large body of research finds that patients forced to pay substantial
out-of-pocket costs for health care make bad choices, particularly in times of
economic distress. Although patients naturally have strong incentives to make
sound choices on going to the doctor, purchasing medications, and the like, they
lack both the knowledge and the emotional distance to do so correctly. Thus, when
a family falls into acute poverty, its attempts to trim costs by foregoing prescribed
medications or to reduce their dose below therapeutic levels may result in disastrous
effects on their health. The false savings of, for example, halving anti-hypertensive
or anti-seizure medications may result in both reduced health status for the
individual and in far more expensive hospitalizations for the health care system.
Similarly, the reticence of the uninsured to seek testing and treatment for the
coronavirus has exacerbated the pandemic.145 The same factors that can trigger
bouts of acute poverty, such as pregnancy or illness, can render an individual more
sensitive to the effects of a lack of basic necessities (as well as stress).146
Other cost-savings that desperate acute poor individuals and families may seek
can be similarly shortsighted. Attempts to save on public transit or taxi fares by
walking at night through dangerous areas can result in muggings. Saving money on
smoke or carbon monoxide detectors or furnace maintenance causes numerous
deaths each year. Families suddenly forced to find less expensive childcare
arrangements before they have sufficient time to investigate the low-cost providers
may rue the day.

145. See Mark Kreidler, We’re Just Starting to See the Devastating Impact that COVID-19 Will
Have on Poor Americans, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90484562/
were-just-starting-to-see-the-devastating-impact-that-covid-19-will-have-on-poor-americans [ https://
perma.cc/U6VQ-DN6B ].
146. Kimberlin & Berrick, supra note 117, at 152.
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c. Psychological Harms
Falling into acute poverty, even for short periods of time, can cause severe
psychological trauma, destroying the sense of security that is important for the
well-being of adults and children alike. Parents’ relationships with their children can
suffer lasting damage. Having to go to school unbathed or in ill-fitting, worn-out,
or dirty clothes can alienate a child from her or his peers on a lasting basis. And
being unable to provide the basic necessities for children can humiliate and depress
parents. The sense of powerlessness resulting from sudden destitution can lead to
depression and listlessness. And the increased financial stress breaks up numerous
marriages. Although studies have shown greater impacts of children’s psychological
and intellectual development from chronic poverty, they have found significant
effects for acute poverty as well.147
2. Undermining Public Policy
Quite apart from its individual effects, acute poverty so severely threatens
important public policies that our current, lackadaisical response to it is quite
surprising. That indifference is certainly shortsighted.
a. Increasing Chronic Poverty
Episodes of acute poverty pose a serious if underappreciated risk of
undermining public policies aimed at eradicating chronic poverty. The hardships of
acute poverty can increase the risk that a family will fall into chronic poverty. This
can happen in several ways. The reverse can demoralize the family, resulting in
decreased efforts to find employment and depressed performances in job
interviews. It can cause couples to split up, increasing all family members’ chances
of falling into chronic poverty. The loss of income can cause the family to fall
behind on its bills, harming its credit rating. With increasing numbers of employers
checking credit reports of job applicants, this can harm the family’s
long-term prospects.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the harms associated with acute poverty may be
sufficiently severe to cause some low-skilled people to prefer chronic poverty. In
their landmark study of the choices that low-skilled single mothers make, Kathryn
Edin and Laura Lein found that many of those staying on welfare rather than
seeking employment did so because they despaired of social programs’ treatment of
the acute poor. They reported that, once laid off from a job, it would take several
months to reinstate their cash assistance and food stamps, during which time they
and their children would face extreme hardship.148 Being realistic about the limits
of the job market’s demand for their skills, they concluded that they had little hope
of leaving poverty completely; their only real choice was between chronic poverty

147.
148.

Id. at 152–53.
EDIN & LEIN, supra note 55, at 68–69.
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and a still austere existence modestly above the poverty line punctuated by periods
of acute poverty. Because they believed that the severity of the hardships during
those bouts of acute poverty would be more severe than the effects of chronic
poverty, they chose the latter.149
b. Damaging the Macroeconomy
Acute poverty can cause serious consequences for the national economy.
People suddenly having their incomes plummet are likely to radically cut back on
their spending. If replicated across a large number of individuals and families, this
can significantly reduce aggregate demand. Depressed demand is likely to cause
businesses to trim their labor forces to match diminished revenues. Those
reductions in employment, in turn, are likely to plunge more people into acute
poverty, reinforcing the destructive cycle. This is the classic problem in
macroeconomic policy that John Maynard Keynes and others sought to address
during the Great Depression and that their followers have highlighted ever since.
Partially in response to Keynesian economics, anti-poverty programs such as
UC and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food
stamps) seek to aid the acute poor, stabilize aggregate demand, and cushion
economic slumps. As discussed below, however, these programs are sharply limited
in their effectiveness in aiding the acute poor and stabilizing a depressed economy.
Although all low-income people face intense pressure to limit their spending,
the acute poor’s hardships are particularly likely to threaten macroeconomic health
for two reasons. First, because they had been spending more prior to the reverses
they suffered, their vendors and the economy as a whole will have been counting
on those funds.
Second, their prior prosperity was likely to induce lenders to offer, and them
to accept, more credit than the chronic poor receive. By contrast, many of the
chronic poor’s creditors are involuntary ones—unpaid landlords, utility companies,
and the like—who likely budgeted for a certain rate of default when they went into
that line of business. The acute poor often will be at risk of defaulting on the same
kinds of debt but may have other, more extensive, debts. If they prioritize those
obligations, their actual purchases of goods and services may decline by a higher
percentage than their incomes do, accelerating the deflationary effects on the overall
economy. This sort of debt deflation, characterized by too many people trying to
pay down debt while too few have the courage to increase their leverage, was a
major factor in the Great Depression and has been an important contributor to the
three most recent U.S. recessions and seems likely to be so again in the
coronavirus recession.
The macroeconomic effects of acute poverty are likely to be greater for victims
of mass disasters because larger numbers will be reducing their spending at once.

149.

Id. at 68-69.
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Even those becoming acutely poor for local or individualized reasons, however, can
contribute to the drag on an already weak economy.
D. The Politics of Acute Poverty
The politics of chronic poverty in the United States are exceedingly complex.
Many supporters of the chronic poor have strong ulterior motives;150 the same is
also true of many of their critics.151 The electorate is hostile to most existing
anti-poverty programs yet also overwhelmingly says we should do more for the
poor, even if doing so would require raising taxes.152 Although some have tried to
fit low-income people into one of the major partisan coalitions, this has proved
disastrous for several reasons. 153 Low-income people lack the clear identity and
effective means of communication required to wield political influence, and the
numbers of votes that politicians can gain by attacking the chronic poor commonly
exceeds the number won by helping them. The chronic poor have fared best when
a handful of politicians from across the ideological spectrum have come to see their
needs as moral imperatives and acted together quietly.154
The politics of acute poverty are quite different, but also complicated. At their
heart is a striking paradox: policymakers, advocates, and scholars across the political
spectrum valorize the acute poor, yet all permit their overwhelming focus on the
chronic poor to lead them to embrace policies that compound the woes of the acute
poor. This arguably is a consequence of the strong desire to maintain discipline
among recipients of public benefits—a desire largely motivated by concerns about
the chronic poor.155
1. Aspirational Politics
Across the ideological spectrum, politicians deem the acute poor to be far
more palatable than the chronic poor. Indeed, the acute poor often seem to typify
many policymakers’ notion of the “worthy poor.” Part of this clearly can be traced

150. The Hudson Institute’s Christopher DeMuth notes that a large proportion of anti-poverty
spending does not go directly to low-income people, but rather to more affluent service providers, such
as doctors, nursing homes, and social workers. FEDERALIST SOC’Y, Comment in The Safety Net
& Poverty [Panel], YOUTUBE (Feb. 27, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FcV-DC1CIXo
[ https://perma.cc/NZ3U-VDAM ].
151. See, e.g., KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE, supra note 54, at 278–80 (seeing
criticism of anti-poverty programs as an excuse to cut taxes on the affluent).
152. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS
OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 27–30 (1999); LESLIE MCCALL, THE UNDESERVING RICH: AMERICAN
BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY, OPPORTUNITY, AND REDISTRIBUTION 193–209 (2013).
153. See Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, supra note 111.
154. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure
of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008) [ hereinafter Super, Laboratories of Destitution ]
(contrasting failed high-profile partisan efforts to liberalize welfare rules with low-profile bipartisan
success in expanding in-kind benefit programs and those for the elderly and people with disabilities);
Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, supra note 111.
155. See infra Section II.A.
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to the acute poor’s greater social and cultural resemblance to the middle-class. As
noted above, the acute poor are whiter, better educated, and better connected to
the workforce than the chronic poor.156 And in our segregated society, more
middle-class people likely know someone who has experienced acute poverty than
someone who is or was chronically poor.
Some of the affinity for the acute poor also may well be fiscal: although
providing four years of aid to one person costs no more than providing one year of
aid to four people, the former may feel like a more open-ended, uncontrollable
commitment. Acute poverty may seem like a fleeting aberration, a quickly
remediable mistake (never mind that that “mistake” keeps recurring); chronic
poverty is far more commonly viewed as something deliberately deviant. The
misperception that acute poverty is far less costly to address than chronic poverty
is a two-edged sword, as it encourages arguments that the private sector, or local
governments with very modest tax bases, can provide what is needed.
In addition, human nature tends to be far more communitarian during acute
crises such as natural disasters. Aid to the chronic poor can appeal to
redistributionists, of which this country has relatively few; aid to the acute poor is
much more about humanitarianism. As noted above, the obvious economic waste
commonly resulting from acute poverty is obviously offensive to seemingly
apolitical preferences for economic efficiency.157 Sometimes, public concern for the
acute poor redounds to the benefit of the chronic poor. Michelle Landis Dauber
shows that many concepts in the New Deal were consciously derived from this
nation’s history of relieving acute poverty brought on by natural disasters.158 The
New Deal, in turn, used the economic disaster of the Great Depression, and
attendant sympathy for the acute poor, to win enactment of programs that aided
large categories of the chronic poor.
Valorization of the acute poor has been a persistent theme in welfare policy
debates since the late 1980s. Candidates for high office brag about having overcome
early bouts of acute poverty as a demonstration of their strong character.159
Polemically, this takes the form of slogans demanding that benefit programs
provide “a trampoline, not a hammock.”160 Analytically, this took the form of
156. See supra Section II.B.2.
157. See supra Section II.C.1.a.
158. Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and “Natural” Disaster Relief: Narrating the
American Welfare State, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 257 (1999); see also Michele L. Landis, “Let Me Next
Time Be ‘Tried By Fire’”: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92
NW. U. L. REV. 967 (1998).
159. See, e.g., CARLY FIORINA, RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: MY LEADERSHIP JOURNEY
(2015); Ashley Parker, Republican Candidates, Minus Donald Trump and Ted Cruz, Play Nice at Poverty
Forum, N.Y. TIMES ( Jan. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/us/politics/republicancandidates-minus-donald-trump-and-ted-cruz-play-nice-at-poverty-forum.html
[ https://perma.cc/
F6JS-PSKV ].
160AP Wire Serv., Gov. Walker Signs 9 Bills Limiting Welfare: ‘More like a Trampoline; Less like a
Hammock,’ FOX6NOW.COM (Apr. 10, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://fox6now.com/2018/04/10/gov-scottwalker-to-sign-9-welfare-overhaul-bills-into-law/ [ https://perma.cc/CZ85-CF9R ].
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debates about the length of spells of assistance. The 1996 welfare law was presaged
by a debate over the size of the acute poor, with both sides assuming that they were
more virtuous. Opponents of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
focused on the long average duration of aid receipt by those on the program at any
given time, suggesting that the program was dominated by the chronic poor.
AFDC’s supporters, in turn, focused on the short average duration of aid of those
entering (or leaving) the program, focusing on AFDC’s importance to the acute
poor.161 A similar, if less prominent, debate proceeded with respect to food stamps,
with both sides assuming that serving a greater faction of acutely poor people made
the program more desirable.
Programmatically, enthusiasm for the acute poor led to the establishment of,
and long-time bipartisan support for, the UC system.162 More generally, when the
Great Depression introduced acute poverty to a huge number of middle-income
people who had previously regarded themselves as very different from the chronic
poor, we saw a dramatic expansion of federal and state intervention against poverty
generally. National health care reform, which had long been on some progressives’
political agenda but never came close to enactment, was helped over the threshold
by the surge in acute poverty generated by the Great Recession. Although the
eventual entrenchment of the Affordable Care Act is likely to lead to broader shifts
in social insurance policy,163 to date the dominant model of aid to the acute poor
has been built around individual, highly discretionary charity rather than
systematic programming.
2. Practical Politics
Despite politicians’ public embrace of the acute poor, the reality is increasingly
different. When forces supportive of, and hostile to, the chronic poor do battle, the
acute poor are all too often collateral casualties. The charitable model allows all sides
in battles over the chronic poor to view the acute poor as not raising significant
public policy issues. And because the acute poor are little considered and even less
well understood, they often bear the brunt of rhetoric and policies intended to
discipline the chronic poor.
a. Inability to Leverage Power Politics
Without effective access to conventional power politics, expansions of
anti-poverty programs typically require a long time to build up support for a change,

161. MARY JO BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO
REFORM 28–40 (1994).
162. Even Charles Murray, who achieved widespread attention for demanding the wholesale
elimination of anti-poverty programs, found UC acceptable. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING
GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, at 230 (1984).
163. David A. Super, The Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care Reform and
Popular Constitutionalism, 66 STAN. L. REV. 873 (2014) [ hereinafter Super, Modernization of American
Public Law ].
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building public awareness, recruiting political leaders whose primary attention is
directed elsewhere, crafting and refining legislation, and wearing down the political
system’s inertia. This kind of time is not available for that segment of the acutely
poor that suffers a simultaneous crisis, such as a natural disaster or an economic
downturn. To be sure, a high-profile mass calamity may accelerate the public’s
awareness of the problem, but the mobilization of the political process—in
particular, recruiting leaders and getting them up to speed—is still a lengthy process.
The fact that the highly publicized mass suffering Hurricane Katrina did not
produce a single permanent change to any major assistance program,164 and that
extensions of UC benefits legislated during recessions are invariably subject to
arbitrary time limits165 (rather than made contingent on economic conditions)166 is
further testament to the political process’s grudging response to the acute poor and
the defensiveness of even their supporters. Little evidence so far has emerged that
the coronavirus recession will be any different: despite a massive public health
problem, not a single state so far seems to be seriously considering expanding
Medicaid to childless adults and parents with incomes between the state’s historical
public assistance grant levels and 138% of the poverty line.
The acute poor are even less likely than the chronic poor to have power within
the political system.167 They tend to be geographically diffuse. And their self-identity
as low-income people is likely to be even thinner than that of the chronic poor,
particularly after the episode of poverty passes. Although some former members of
the acute poor may return to the ranks of middle-income people with greater
sympathy for anti-poverty programs,168 many find the experience so traumatic that
they wish to distance themselves from it as much as possible. This is particularly
true because, as discussed below, our current programs often fail to provide timely,
meaningful assistance to the acutely poor. Although some social scientists suggest
replacing the “poor/non-poor” dichotomy in our thinking with a range from
“persistent poverty” through “transitory poverty” and “economic vulnerability” to
“financial security,”169 asking people to admit even to being vulnerable requires a
severe hit to their self-esteem---all the more so in a society whose response to
chronic poverty includes shaming of economic adversity. Thus, the exigencies of
their condition prevent them from being politically active during their periods of

164. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375 (2011) (describing
failure to enact timely legislation in response to the mass devastation of Hurricane Katrina).
165. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1400v (2018) (providing UC benefits with a fixed national
termination date).
166. See CHAD STONE & HANNAH SHAW, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS REMAIN CRITICAL FOR THE ECONOMY 1
(2010), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-10-10ui.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/
HQE5-TK44 ] (noting the impending cessation of extended UC despite unemployment well above 9%).
167. See Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, supra note 111 (explaining why power politics
has proven inferior to humanitarian appeals in U.S. anti-poverty politics).
168. See Duncan et al., supra note 113, at 88 (suggesting that possibility).
169. Id.
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acute distress and denial of their vulnerability makes efforts to secure a more robust
safety net unlikely when their situation improves.
The recent rise in protectionist populism in both major political parties
suggests another possible route to gaining attention for the acute poor within the
realm of power politics. Even if broader trade improves efficiency and hence total
economic well-being, it inevitably yields major losers in industries vulnerable to
competition from imports. Cushioning the blow for those rendered acutely poor by
layoffs and plant closings would be wise for free trade advocates. To date, however,
their interest in anti-poverty programs has been limited to SNAP, and even then,
only as a way of diverting money from trade-distorting farm subsidy programs.170
This does not preclude appeals to empathy and public ethics, but that, too,
faces practical obstacles. Critics of low-income people and programs that serve
them have achieved enormous success in painting the chronic poor as the only
image of low-income people generally. Anti-poverty groups for the most part have
accepted this characterization and seen fit to do battle on the ground chosen by
their foes.
b. The Limited Efficacy of Litigation for the Acute Poor
Nor have the acute poor fared well in less conventional forms of political
struggle. Litigation, which played a symbiotic role with anti-poverty political
advocacy prior to 1995,171 obtained little traction on behalf of the acute poor. Such
cases were procedurally difficult to sustain, with many potential plaintiffs becoming
moot before complaints could be filed and others struggling to ward off dismissals
for mootness.172 These factors made systemic unemployment compensation cases
relatively unusual.173 Even in a period when it was interpreting welfare law
generously for chronically poor recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC),174 the Supreme Court responded harshly in Quern v. Mandley to
acutely poor claimants’ attempt to regularize AFDC’s Emergency Assistance (EA)
component.175 Hewing closely to the charity-inspired discretionary model rather
than the legalistic approach it had taken to the chronic poor, the Court announced
a sweeping principle of deference to states’ judgments. Although the Court later

170. David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in
the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1370–77 (2004) [ hereinafter Super, Quiet
“Welfare” Revolution ] (describing the successful efforts of pro-trade Republicans, including President
Bush, to shift money from agricultural programs to SNAP in the 2002 Farm Bill).
171. David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual
Rights, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2005).
172. But see Hess v. Hughes, 500 F. Supp. 1054, 1057–58 (D. Md. 1980) (rejecting such
an argument).
173. See Esparza v. Valdez, 862 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1988) (dismissing UC suit for mootness).
174. See, e.g., Philbrook v. Glodget, 421 U.S. 707 (1975) (striking down state restrictions on
AFDC eligibility in a unanimous opinion by Justice Rehnquist).
175. Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978).
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backtracked somewhat in Blum v. Bacon,176 its failure to provide a clear basis for
distinguishing between the two cases, and its obvious discomfort at legalizing the
response to acute poverty, left legal services lawyers skeptical that additional such
litigation was worth allocating limited resources to bring.
c. Privatizing the Response to Acute Poverty
The greater sympathy much of the public holds for the acute poor facilitates
recruiting and energizing volunteers. With many in public life seeking to shift
responsibility to private charities for as many human services needs as possible,
charities often find themselves the primary source of aid to some low-income
people. An example of the strength of this feeling may be seen in the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),
which cut food stamps more than $27 billion over six years—almost entirely
through across-the-board benefit reductions. It also, however, added $600 million
over the same period to buy commodities for emergency food providers to
distribute to hungry families in crisis, including those suffering from the food stamp
cuts. The private-sector delivery mechanism, and the targeting on the acute poor,
have made The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP) immensely popular.
Diffuse private charitable delivery mechanisms, however, also have the effect of
concealing the extent of the problem. It is easy to assume that the kindhearted
people running food pantries would never turn away a family in genuine need,
ignoring the reality that they must do just that if need far outstrips the resources
provided to them.177
The for-profit sector also plays a larger part in responding to acute poverty
than to chronic poverty. This has caused considerable alarm that these entities were
siphoning off much of the little disposable income individuals and families have. In
particular, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau initially recognized this and
is, in effect, sought to limit payday and other sub-prime lenders to doing business
with the acute poor, not the chronic poor. President Trump’s appointees since have
reversed this policy.178 Even if it wanted to, the Bureau’s ability to achieve this result
is far from clear, but even if it can, it is a relatively modest one: some developing
countries combat acute poverty with state-sponsored low-interest lenders.179

176.
177.

Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982).
See Janet Poppendieck, SWEET CHARITY? EMERGENCY FOOD AND THE END OF
ENTITLEMENT (1998) (showing a vast mismatch between emergency food resources and need).
178. Nicholas Confessore & Stacy Cowley, Trump Appointees Manipulated Agency’s Payday
Lending Research, Ex-Staffer Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/29/business/cfpb-payday-loans-rules.html [ https://perma.cc/W7GP-ZGGE ].
179. See, e.g., Description of “Tia Rica” Program, GOBIERNO DE CHILE, https://
www.dicrep.cl/la-institucion/historia/ [ https://perma.cc/R7BH-EV79 ].
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d. Collateral Damage in Battles over the Chronic Poor
Our obsession with the chronic poor clouds our thinking about the acute
poor. To begin with, the popular trampoline metaphor is hardly apt: the acute poor
often provide their own energy for escaping poverty and seek much the same sort
of support as the chronic poor, just for a shorter time. But the notion that
low-income people need to be forcibly launched toward greater self-sufficiency fits
nicely with condescending narratives about low-income people generally and makes
no distinction between those who raise their incomes of their own volition and
those that the state must press to do so.
Budget cutting fervor typically crescendos right after the trough of an
economic cycle.180 At this point, the headline deficit numbers look frightening to
the unsophisticated voter and claims that tax cuts will accelerate an anemic recovery
find a receptive audience. To support these demands for austerity come attacks on
recipients of public benefits as doing too little to help themselves. A large fraction
of those recipients, however, are those suffering acute poverty because of
the recession.
Defenders of the chronic poor, too, often badly undermine the acute poor. To
show their fiscal probity, they have largely eschewed seeking permanent legislation
that would provide additional aid whenever specified indicators (such as the
unemployment rate) exceeded certain thresholds, leaving the acute poor to hope
Congress timely enacts new legislation for each crisis. They similarly seek to
demonstrate probity by embracing draconian reporting, verification, and anti-fraud
measures, which affect the naïve far more than the dishonest. If anything, these
policies commonly target the acute poor with particular vigor because they look
more like the non-poor (and hence ineligible) than the chronic poor do.
More generally, in their efforts to assure skeptical voters and policymakers that
the chronic poor receiving benefits from public programs are in fact the “truly
needy,” the chronic poor’s supporters agreed to extremely rigorous eligibility
requirements that denied participation to claimants whose situations offered any
ambiguity at all. They thus sharpened the line between middle-income voters and
destitute people in extreme need, denying aid to claimants with one foot in each of
those two worlds. Because that is precisely the position of many of the acute poor,
these rules denied aid to many of them.
Although some changes in program rules have helped the acute poor, most of
those were enacted primarily to benefit the stable near-poor instead. These changes
include liberalization or elimination of resource limits, lifted income eligibility limits,
and procedural simplifications such as self-attestation of income in Medicaid.
Often, however, these reforms for the stable near-poor required substantial current
earnings, excluding many of the acute poor.

180.

David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544 (2005).
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e. Active Hostility Toward the Acute Poor
In recent years, critics of anti-poverty policies have made their attacks on the
acute poor much more explicit.181 The Tea Party is widely regarded as having sprung
up in response to a rant against aid to the acute poor in the mortgage crisis.182
Despite the Great Recession’s obvious severity, critics insisting that it reflected a
collective failure of the work ethic—effectively tarring the acute poor with the same
“behavioral poverty” brush long wielded against aid to the chronic poor—received
surprising prominence. As our politics become less and less able to grapple with
institutional problems and more addicted to blame and scapegoating, this trend is
likely to continue.
These attacks have had real-world effects, hurting the chronic poor but often
hurting the acute poor even more. North Carolina sharply reduced the number of
weeks of UC available to laid-off workers even at the cost of reducing its receipt of
federal funds. Arizona recently reduced its lifetime limit on aid under the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) to twelve months. This is not even
superficially adequate for the acute poor: during and after the Great Recession,
Arizona’s unemployment rate exceeded 8% for almost four consecutive years—and
exceeded 10% for nineteen consecutive months.183 At the behest of the American
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and the Secretary’s Innovation Group (SIG),
Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, and Oklahoma enacted legislation
prohibiting their human services departments from seeking routine waivers of
SNAP’s three-month time limit on childless adults for areas with abnormally high
unemployment and other states eligible for the continuation of such waivers
declined to renew them.
II. TYPES OF POLICIES THAT INCREASE HARDSHIP FOR THE ACUTE POOR
Although public welfare law has been intensely controversial over the years,
virtually all influential positions across the ideological spectrum in this country have
shared several key assumptions. This consensus standard model of anti-poverty law
is built around concerns about moral hazard: that providing aid to low-income
181. See David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 2032 (2004) (describing the importance of moral critiques of low-income people in
contemporary policymaking).
182. Danny Vinik, CNBC’s Rick Santelli Was Embarrassed on Live TV for Being Wrong About
the Economy. But He’s Hardly Alone, NEW REPUBLIC ( July 14, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/
article/118693/steve-liesman-cuts-short-rick-santellis-cnbc-rant-about-inflation [ https://perma.cc/
AK9Y-GGRR ].
183. Unemployment in Arizona reached 8.2% in December 2008 and did not drop back below
8% until October 2012 (and even then, remained within a few tenths of a percentage point of 8% for
several additional months). Arizona’s unemployment rate was at least 10% from May 2009 through
November 2010. Arizona’s Unemployment Statistics from January 2008 to December 2012,
U.S. BUREAU L. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/ ( last visited Apr. 21, 2020 ) (click “DATA TOOLS” from
drop down menu; then, “Data Retrieval Tools;” then “Unemployment;” then click on “Data Finder”
icon next to “Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS);” click Arizona Unemployment Rate
hyperlink; select 2008 for the “Start Year” and 2012 for “End Year;” lastly, click “Update”).
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people invites abuse in the form of claims from people who either are not in need
or are in need because of their own moral failings. Liberals and conservatives often
disagree about what constitutes need and what counts as a moral failing, and they
may contest the resources that society should devote to aiding the poor, but they
broadly agree that fighting moral hazard by restricting access to aid is one of the
most important goals of program design.184 In essence, this model requires
claimants to fall into, and demonstrate, destitution before receiving most forms of
assistance with monthly subsistence costs.185
Public benefit programs restrict access in a variety of ways. Some affect
potential claimants’ propensity to apply; others are rules restricting which applicants
may receive benefits. These rules may be divided between procedural and
substantive requirements, both of which commonly exclude large numbers of
people from major programs. Substantive rules, in turn, include both financial and
non-financial eligibility requirements. Financial rules include income eligibility
limits,186 which are administered with filing unit rules187 (i.e., rules about which
other people’s income counts when a claimant seeks benefits) and budgeting (i.e.,
rules specifying the period for which income is relevant to eligibility).188 Some
programs also base eligibility on the resources (assets) available to the claimant.189
Non-financial rules often include categorical rules (e.g., limiting benefits to the
elderly, or to persons with disabilities, or to families with children),190 conduct
requirements,191 and sometimes waiting lists or other priority rules for distributing
benefits if the program lacks the funding to serve all eligible people who apply and
comply with all program procedures.192
A great many policies restricting access to means-tested benefits affect the
acute and chronic poor similarly. Categorical rules excluding childless adults or
income eligibility limits, for example, simply narrow the kinds of needs the programs
will recognize. They probably have roughly the same effect on acute and chronic
poor claimants.
Several restrictive policies, however, reduce the availability of aid to the acute
poor substantially more than they do to the chronic poor. These underappreciated

184. This is far less true in much of Europe, where corporatist and social democratic models
predominate. See supra note 95.
185. The model does not require destitution to receive certain services, such as health care, or
for annual assistance through the tax code.
186. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (2018) (setting income eligibility limits for SNAP).
187. See, e.g., id. § 2012(m) (defining who must be included in the “household” unit for which
claimants make SNAP applications).
188. See, e.g., id. § 2014(f) (establishing two possible budgeting methods for SNAP).
189. See, e.g., id. § 2014(g) (setting resource eligibility rules for SNAP).
190. See, e.g., id. § 2015(o) (limiting many childless adults to three months of SNAP benefits
every three years); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2018) (limiting TANF block grant funds to families with children);
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (limiting Medicaid categories existing prior to the Affordable Care Act).
191. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d), (l) (imposing work and child support cooperation requirements
in SNAP).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1786(g)(4) (requiring WIC program to have such a priority system).
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effects severely exacerbate the effects of acute poverty on individual low-income
people and on society as a whole. This Part identifies several types of those policies.
A. Deterrence Policies
Deterrence policies seeking to raise the costs of participating above its
expected benefits are a crucial part of how policymakers restrict the chronic poor’s
participation in public benefit programs.193 The remainder of this Section discusses
the ways in which eligibility policies disqualify the acute poor, intentionally or
otherwise. Many of the policies seeking to deter participation, however, may have
as great or greater impacts. Some research suggests that the acute poor often are in
even worse financial shape when they apply for public benefits than the average
chronic poor recipient.
The stigma attached to receiving means-tested benefits is likely to afflict and
deter the acute poor far more than the chronic poor for several reasons. First, the
acute poor are likely to live in social circles where participation in these programs is
much less common; being discovered buying food with SNAP or switching to a
physician who accepts Medicaid therefore may seem more surprising and alienating.
Second, acute poor people are likely to have had less experience with these
programs and their stigma. Stigma’s effects are likely to decline over time. Those
that have never received public benefits before may be particularly reluctant to cross
that line, perhaps overestimating the shame they would feel from receiving aid or
perhaps feeling pride in having never received such benefits. Even among those that
have received public benefits previously, the longer one does so, the more specific
embarrassing events—being seen by a friend entering a welfare office, being
criticized by strangers for SNAP purchases, explaining to a doctor why one is
changing to a Medicaid provider, sitting in a filthy waiting room, being asked
personal questions in a cubicle with little privacy, etc.—they already will have
experienced. Although these experiences take their toll on claimants’ morale, they
also reduce the potential harm from further applications and participation.
And third, the acute poor may face particular moral criticism for receiving
benefits based on assumptions that they could have avoided needing the aid.
The relative deterrence effects of paperwork requirements are more
ambiguous. On the one hand, many of these policies’ attrition among eligible
claimants results from limited literacy or numeracy. Because the acute poor as a
group are better educated than the chronic poor, they presumably will be less
frequently confused by obscurely written forms and notices. On the other hand,
public benefit programs’ administrative apparatuses are notoriously inconsistent at
even trying to explain themselves. The chronic poor may have much greater access
to other sources of information about how the bureaucracy behaves and what it
expects of them: their own prior experiences or those of their friends and relatives.
193. David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for
Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815 (2004) [ hereinafter Super, Offering an Invisible Hand ].
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The absence of this bureaucratic experience may result in delays or denials of aid
even for the most diligent and literate acute poor claimants. Some of the chronic
poor are so exhausted and disorganized that they fail to meet important
administrative deadlines; some of the acute poor may be so in shock from their
sudden reversal, or so demoralized from the position in which they find themselves,
that they, too, fail to meet such deadlines.
B. Procedural Rules Failing to Accommodate the Acute Poor
Unfortunately, many of the assumptions underlying anti-poverty programs are
built upon images of the chronic poor. These assumptions often prove deeply
flawed even when applied to the chronic poor but are even more so with respect to
the acute poor.
For example, the public welfare system commonly assumes that claimants are
entirely idle, with unlimited time available for agencies to allocate as they see fit.
The result is burdensome eligibility determination processes, featuring long waits
and massive busywork, as well as grossly inefficient “welfare-to-work” and child
support enforcement programs. These time-wasters frequently clash with the
part-time jobs, parent-teacher conferences, caregiving responsibilities, medical
appointments, and other agency involvements of chronically poor claimants.
Acutely poor people are even more likely to have conflicting demands on their time,
either seeking to resolve whatever barrier to employment cast them into poverty or
looking for work directly. We should not be compelling acute poor people with
extensive, often skilled, employment histories to choose between applying for jobs
for which they are specially qualified and sitting in a “job club” making endless rote
phone calls to employers of unskilled labor hoping that a vacancy has occurred in
the three minutes since the last “job club” participant called.194
In addition to assuming that claimants have unlimited time on any particular
day, public benefit programs also tend to assume that claimants are in no particular
hurry to find employment. Thus, long waiting lists for childcare assistance arouse
little public attention or outrage. For the acute poor, who are mindful that every
month they are out of work makes them look less desirable to prospective
employers, these waiting lists are devastating.
Public benefit programs also are remarkably unselfconscious about the
complexity of the procedures claimants must navigate to secure benefits. Tests of
the reading levels of application forms and program information materials routinely
find them requiring college-level reading skills or above. Even new legal services
attorneys are commonly baffled when attempting to help their clients complete
these forms. Chronic poor claimants master the forms through a combination of
trial and error and knowing people experienced in navigating the programmatic
maze. Acute poor claimants, by contrast, are likely to err. At best, this will result in
a denial that the claimants may mistake for a decision on the merits. At worst, honest
194.

Duncan et al., supra note 113, at 88.
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errors may trigger fraud investigations by offices with quotas to meet, terrifying the
claimant and anyone who knows her or him.
C. Defective Measures of Financial Need
Means tests in public benefit programs pursue a variety of often-inconsistent
aims. Some focus solely on the income readily available to a claimant to meet one
or a set of expenses. Others, however, seek to limit benefits to a subset of
low-income people in a particular type of circumstances, often extreme destitution.
Indeed, some eligibility restrictions originated at least in part in efforts to keep the
acute poor out of programs. This seems to have reflected a profile of people in need
that the acute poor did not meet because of their lingering similarities to the middle
class. Rules requiring extreme destitution commonly hit the acute poor hard,
allowing the chronic poor alone to qualify when their destitution becomes
sufficiently extreme.
For example, restrictions on the resources that recipients could own insist that
claimants reach extreme destitution before sending public aid.195 In the case of
liquid resources, this could be justified as demanding that the acute poor rely on
their savings as their primary safety net, rather than public aid. Critics might
challenge that demand by arguing that means-tested programs should be regarded
as social insurance, with general tax payments being the premiums. This social
insurance model, and the greater participation of the acute poor that it would yield,
would enhance social cohesion as well as the political health of these programs
relative to the dominant destitution model. But at least the demand that personal
savings be acutely poor people’s first resort is a coherent allocation of public funds.
Far more problematic are disqualifications for holding non-liquid resources.
Nobody can eat their car, and a forced sale of one creates enormous financial waste.
It also is likely to adversely affect the claimants’ ability to find and keep employment
and cope with the chores of daily life such as buying food and getting children to
school. The standard vision of the poor, which very much specifies the chronic
poor, expects total destitution and does not consider employment-related needs. (It
also is distinctly urban, not contemplating that the lack of a car could isolate a
claimant from society and put the basic necessities out of reach.) Rules counting
claimants’ homes as resources,196 or subjecting them to liens for the value of
assistance paid,197 similarly insist on total degradation as a condition of receiving
aid. They thus fit well into Piven and Cloward’s narrative of harsh public assistance
programs seeking to sharpen lines between low-wage workers and the destitute as a
means of disciplining those workers.

195. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2014(g)(1) (limiting resources SNAP participants may own).
196. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i)(B)(5) (1996) (counting certain houses unless the family
demonstrates an inability to sell).
197. See Charleston v. Wohlgemuth, 332 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (upholding such liens).
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Rules disqualifying claimant based on retirement savings may represent
policymakers’ obliviousness rather than design. Their image of the chronic poor has
no place for retirement savings. To be sure, those rules originated in an era before
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 401(k)s, 403(b)s, and the like were
widespread. But the large numbers of low-wage workers not covered, or vested, in
pension plans have long had to make their own provisions to supplement Social
Security. Whether through savings accounts, rental properties, or other means, these
assets are essential to avoiding poverty in their old ages. The destitution-based
model of the chronic poor, however, assumes that they will always be poor—and
hence requires claimants to divest. This model makes no allowance for the
acute poor.
Filing unit rules can play similar roles. The destitution model assumes that the
chronic poor are surrounded by other chronic poor people in their homes and
families. It enforces this assumption by counting the income and resources of those
people in determining a claimant’s eligibility.198 This can disqualify acutely poor
claimants who remain embedded in more prosperous families. From a
cost-reduction perspective, this may appear plausible: the friends and relatives
taking in an acutely poor individual may have the theoretical ability to meet all of
her or his needs. In practice, they may have reached the limit of their willingness to
provide assistance when they made a spare room available to the individual.
Requiring that the host’s circumstances be counted may effectively force the
claimant to choose between the only available source of housing and public benefits
eligibility. Although these filing unit rules can have similar effects on the chronic
poor, more of those offering housing to the chronic poor are likely to be poor
enough themselves not to eliminate financial eligibility.
D. Flawed Efforts to Separate the Acute and Chronic Poor
Although many of the acute poor’s difficulties result from their inability to
meet requirements designed for the chronic poor, in some situations, policymakers
have deliberately sought to treat the acute and chronic poor differently. Some
important programs formally or informally bar the acute poor or treat them
significantly less well than the chronic poor. In other situations, attempts to provide
specifically for the acute poor have fallen victim to the toxic politics of
chronic poverty.
1. Programs that Expressly or Implicitly Require Chronic Poverty
Because the acute poor are, by definition, in need for only relatively short
periods of time, a host of timing rules can effectively disqualify many of them from

198. SNAP counts the income and resources of any person living with, and purchasing and
preparing food with, a claimant. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(m)(1)(B). Other programs may limit the counting of
income to relatives living with the claimant. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(35) (2018) (requiring legally
responsible relatives’ circumstances to be counted in determining eligibility for Medicaid).
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aid. This is particularly true of requirements that need have a specified minimum
duration, waiting periods, and benefits paid after great delays.
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) disability benefits are limited to those whose disabilities have lasted or are
expected to last for twelve months and those whose conditions are expected to
result in death. No matter how severely ill or injured—and no matter how
completely unable to work—a worker may be, if she or he is likely to recover within
a year she or he is ineligible for SSDI and SSI. Those injured on the job may be
covered by workers’ compensation, although delays in processing claims and
disputes about injuries’ causation often prevent the claimant from receiving timely
aid. Those hurt in non-covered employment and those that become ill or injured in
other ways—communicable disease, automotive accident, etc.—are unlikely to
receive any help unless they are among the minority of employees covered by
workplace disability policies. Few state or local governments have disability-based
cash assistance programs for those not qualifying for SSI.
Even those meeting SSDI’s durational requirement generally cannot receive
Medicare coverage for twenty-four months. In addition to burdening chronic poor
claimants for two years, this rule absolutely denies coverage to those acutely disabled
for periods between one and two years.
Other programs’ explicit “waiting periods” similarly have disproportionate
impacts on the acute poor.199 For example, UC typically imposes at least a one-week
explicit waiting period on new applicants. It also can require much longer waits for
claimants who need their earnings in the current or just-completed calendar quarter
to obtain insured status under UC.
Housing presents a stark example of this. The acute poor’s problems with
housing—manifested in homelessness—is relatively well-known and arouses broad
public sympathy. Yet our major housing assistance programs exclusively serve the
chronic poor. All have waiting lists that put housing out of reach for even acute
poor families suffering relatively long bouts of poverty. Although the programs now
do allow more near-poor families to qualify—indirectly covering some acute poor
families by serving them even when they are not poor—this actually exacerbates the
waiting lists because the expansion in eligibility was not accompanied by an
expansion in the supply of subsidies. Thus, housing programs’ relative generosity to
the chronic poor—by not matching eligibility limits to available supply—effectively
closes these programs to the acute poor. What is left is a thin patchwork of
emergency shelters run by some local governments and private charities that offer
some of the worst housing conditions—lacking privacy and security for residents’
persons and property—in our society today.

199. Thus, for example, a worker who is disabled for ten years will lose 20% of her or his
potential Medicare coverage to the waiting period while five workers who are disabled for two years
each—claimants who collectively will receive approximately the same amount in SSDI—will receive no
Medicare coverage at all.
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Programs relying on long accounting periods to determine need have the
equivalent of a rolling waiting period.200 This is particularly true of programs
administered through the tax system. These programs neglect the acute poor both
because their long accounting periods can minimize or miss completely periods of
acute poverty and often because of their delayed provision of aid.
For example, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) bases eligibility on annual
income. A family that experiences a bout of severe poverty that crosses from one
year to the next may not have a low enough income in either year to qualify for a
substantial EITC. Even if an acutely poor family does qualify, it will not receive
assistance until months, often many months, later. By contrast, a family in chronic
poverty will receive similar EITCs each year based on its circumstances during the
prior year: EITC’s temporal mismatch will not cause them much harm, apart from
the lack of aid during the family’s first year of low-wage employment. In theory,
prior to 2010, the Internal Revenue Code allowed up to about 60% of a family’s
anticipated EITC to be paid as part of its paycheck throughout the year,201 but this
“advance payment” option never served more than about 1% of recipients. The low
take-up rate of advance payment of the EITC results from both employers’
resistance and workers’ fear of incurring large tax liability if the advance payment
proves excessive. This latter concern essentially reflects a recognition that EITC is
not designed to serve the acutely poor and will punish those using it to help them
through part-year episodes of need.
The premium tax credits for purchasing insurance under the Affordable Care
Act are only modestly better suited to the needs of the acute poor. It, too, relies on
an annual accounting period that can miss or understate periods of acute poverty.
It generally relies on circumstances in the prior year (as reflected in that year’s tax
return, if any was filed) to determine current need, with limited provision for
providing assistance to those having suffered economic reverses. It does provide
aid on a current basis with a far more effective advance payment mechanism than
the EITC. But because it claws back premium tax credits that exceed those
subsequently determined with an annual accounting period, it effectively offers the
acute poor only an opportunity to borrow assistance, with a requirement to repay
by the following April 15.202 Most acutely poor people are uncertain when their

200. This is by no means inevitable. For example, although SNAP uses retrospective accounting
for certain ongoing recipients, it determines eligibility and benefits prospectively for new applicants
and, even when accounting retroactively, can disregard terminated sources of income. 7
C.F.R. § 273.21(g)(1)–(3) (2019). SNAP’s retrospective accounting does not reach back more than two
months, yielding far more current assessments of need than those in the tax-based benefit programs;
the need for adjusting benefits to meet current needs is far greater when a program relies on information
a year or more in the past to determine need.
201. 26 U.S.C. § 3507, repealed by Pub. L. No. 111-226, § 218, 124 Stat. 2403 (2010).
202. If the family has received sufficient income in the first part of the year to render it ineligible
for large premium tax credits when determined on an annual basis, it will not be able to receive more
during a period of acute poverty in the latter part of the year.
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fortunes will improve and are leery of putting themselves in a position to owe a
large sum to the IRS if their hardship lingers.
Even where a program does not impose an explicit durational eligibility
requirement, its design can effectively deny aid to the acute poor in their time of
need. For example, most states deny UC to workers who lose their jobs due to
medical crises of their own or loved ones.203 SNAP denies benefits to many
otherwise-eligible people who are acutely poor because of their enrollment in higher
education;204 most states’ TANF-funded cash assistance programs effectively do the
same thing.205
At times, policymakers become so enamored of the idea of lifting up the
dysfunctional chronic poor that they deny eligibility to the acute poor struggling to
get by in the circumstances to which the acute poor are to be raised. For example,
AFDC applied more favorable deductions to earnings from jobs obtained by
recipients while on aid than to jobs that applicants already held.206 The TANF
legislation similarly provides for exempting from resource consideration moneys
that recipients deposit into Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) but makes
no similar provision for assets already held by new applicants.207
2. Displaced Hostility for the Chronic Poor Affecting the Acute Poor
Programs nominally designed to aid the acute poor have all too often been
damaged and distorted by fierce hostility to the chronic poor. Nowhere is this more
apparent than in the most prominent program for the acute poor: UC. UC hugs the
line between universal and anti-poverty programs: although it has no formal means
test, it is available only to those without employment, steering most of its benefits
to the poor and near-poor. It seeks to exclude the chronic poor by conditioning
eligibility on substantial recent employment, by denying benefits to those with
current barriers to re-employment, and by strictly time-limiting benefits.
Yet fears that it might serve substantial numbers of the chronic poor have led
to numerous harsh measures that exclude acutely poor workers. Its requirement that
claimants’ prior employment be of a high intensity and duration make it unavailable
to workers that had been maintaining themselves through intermittent or seasonal
employment and to parents who combined work with caregiving. Its effective
exclusion of people working as independent contractors excludes the acute poor
203. CHAD STONE & HANNAH SHAW, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, ADDRESSING
LONGSTANDING GAPS IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE 1 (rev. 2007),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-20-07ui.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/
6R8P-EJ3K ].
204. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(e) (2018).
205. While not explicitly denying aid on the basis of student status as SNAP does,
TANF-funded programs commonly impose other time-consuming requirements that effectively
compel claimants to drop out. Other examples exist. SNAP denies aid to those acutely poor because of
one particular kind of economic calamity: a labor strike. Id. § 2015(d)(3); 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(e).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1994) (repealed 1996).
207. Id. § 604(d).
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that run afoul of a large and growing segment of the contingent labor market. And
the judgments it passes on the legitimacy of the cause of a claimant’s separation
from prior employment reflect the same kind of moralizing common in programs
for the chronic poor. The result has been that low and declining shares of the
unemployed receive UC, even in severe recessions. Although a few states have
moderated some of these rules, particularly in response to complaints about their
gendered impact, at least as many states have tightened UC eligibility. Our political
system finds it increasingly difficult to resist moralizing against all low-income
people, acute and chronic alike.
The most prominent means of distinguishing between the acute and chronic
poor is a time limit on eligibility. Time limits, however, have several serious flaws.
First, they often reflect wishful thinking about which needs are acute and which are
chronic. After the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, the most significant
deduction from earnings for newly employed AFDC recipients ended after just four
months, reflecting the preposterous assumption that low-skilled workers were no
longer the “truly needy” and could fend for themselves after this time. Transitional
Medical Assistance and Transitional Child Care programs typically provide six to
twelve months of benefits to newly employed workers, implausibly implying that
low-skilled employment somehow would begin to provide health insurance and
wages sufficient to afford appropriate childcare within a short time
after employment.208
Second, because any time limit is inherently arbitrary, and no fixed line
separates the acute from the chronic poor, these rules commonly disqualify
significant numbers of acutely poor people. This is particularly true in the wake of
devastating mass disasters, of “post-modern” recessions that typically lead to slow
recoveries, and to those unemployed in a community whose economy has suffered
major plant closures or similar calamities. But it is also possible where acute poverty
springs from an extended but not infinite incapacity. Moreover, because one limit
is unlikely to be demonstrably better than another at separating these groups,
political and budgetary pressures to ratchet down the time limits prove difficult
to resist.
Finally, and relatedly, because time limits inherently involve arbitrary denials
of aid to people in clear actual need, they establish a political precedent that can
readily morph into much broader denials of aid to needy people. Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania pioneered time limits in their general assistance programs,
emphasizing the relative virtue of the “transitionally needy” over those that were

208. Transitional SNAP benefits arguably operate on a different, more defensible basis: they
suspend virtually all reporting and verification requirements for five months when a household works
its way off of TANF-funded cash assistance, almost always providing substantially greater benefits than
the regular SNAP eligibility rules would. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(s). The assumption that the recipient will
become better able to manage SNAP’s reporting rules once her or his employment situation has
stabilized is probably founded, and a modest five-month benefits bonus seems a plausible
work incentive.
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“chronically needy” without good excuse.209 Within a relatively few years, they had
eliminated these programs altogether.210 PRWORA imposed a five-year lifetime
limit on assistance under its TANF block grant. Today, the fraction of poor families
with children receiving cash assistance is lower than at any time since the 1950s. Yet
most of the reduction springs not from the time limits themselves but from other
measures that also deny aid to families in need whose legitimacy became impossible
to attack after the principle of time limits was accepted. PRWORA imposed a
three-month time limit for food stamps that the Administration proposes extending
to Medicaid and housing assistance programs.
E. Fiscal Policies
Our lack of coherent, consistent fiscal strategy for income transfer
programs211 results in irrational policy shifts whose timing is particularly harmful to
the acute poor. Vocal concern about spending on anti-poverty programs is
dominated overwhelmingly by attacks on the cost of programs for the chronic poor.
Particularly during and after recessions, critics claim that those programs’ spending
is “out of control” and paint a picture in which a substantially larger share of the
population is becoming chronically dependent on government aid. Former
Governor Mitt Romney’s famous categorization of 47% of Americans as “takers”
is just one example of that phenomenon.212
Yet the surging participation that is driving those complaints typically consists
overwhelmingly of the acute poor (along with some who begin receiving aid as
acutely poor and have difficulty returning to their prior circumstances because of
extended economic weakness). And it is these influxes of the acute poor that drive
major cutbacks on human services programs serving both the acute poor and the
chronic poor. On the federal level, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981,213 the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,214 PRWORA,215 the Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005,216 and the 2014 Farm Bill217 all came in the wake of recessions when
critics charged that participation in major public benefit programs was declining too

209.
210.

KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE, supra note 54, at 283–85.
MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE 303 (2001).
211. See Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, supra note 180 (finding much of current fiscal
federalism pro-cyclical, exacerbating swings in the business cycle).
212. Making and Taking: Distributional Politics and Growth, ECONOMIST: DEMOCRACY
AM. (Sept. 21, 2012), https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2012/09/21/making-andtaking [ https://perma.cc/NKW2-R2W4 ].
213. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981: Titles III, VI, IX, XI, XXVI,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357.
214. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
215. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
216. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
217. Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649.
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slowly. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982218 fit this pattern as well,
although by the time it passed, a new recession had begun. The funding caps on
programs that are not responsive entitlements, too, have their greatest impacts
during recessions and the still-depressed economies that follow them.219 Programs
with waiting lists, as noted above, become effectively closed to the acute poor, with
chronic poor recipients unlikely to find the means of leaving and other chronic poor
claimants already ensconced on the waiting list.
The effect on the state and local level is even more dramatic. All state and local
governments face legal or traditional requirements of balancing their operating
budgets on an annual basis.220 This prevents them from freeing additional resources
to assist the acute poor suffering from regional or national economic declines.
Indeed, because those declines depress revenues, state and local governments
commonly shrink anti-poverty programs precisely at the time large numbers of
acute poor people need aid. As these program cuts further reduce demand in the
state and local economy, spending and sales tax revenues fall further, fueling
additional rounds of cuts.
Efforts to mitigate the disproportionate impact of fiscal constraints on the
acute poor have been halting at best. Federal “pay-as-you-go” budgetary rules,221
which ordinarily require offsetting spending reductions or tax increases in legislation
that expand benefit programs or cuts taxes, can be suspended in response to
economic emergencies.222 That authority, however, is rarely invoked; the cost of
spending (as opposed to tax cuts) enacted in response to recent recessions
commonly has been offset,223 minimizing any positive macroeconomic effect and
limiting the funds that could be made available to the acute poor. Indeed, leveraging
the threat of a default on U.S. government debt, Congress induced President
Obama to accept sweeping, across-the-board spending reductions in 2011 while the
ranks of the unemployed were still swollen from the recession.224
Somewhat better at meeting the acute poor’s needs is the structure of
budgetary and responsive entitlements,225 such as UC and SNAP, which do not
require new legislation to serve additional people qualifying in harsh economic

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-273, 96 Stat. 763.
David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633 (2004).
Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, supra note 180, at 2592.
2 U.S.C. § 934 (2018).
Id. § 907a(a).
See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 113TH CONG., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
COST
ESTIMATE:
BIPARTISAN
BUDGET
ACT
OF
2013
(2013)
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/costestimate/bipartisan-budgetact-20130.pdf [ https://perma.cc/TBC4-TV3M ] (explaining that increased domestic spending would
be offset with entitlement cuts and some revenue increases).
224. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240.
225. A budgetary entitlement is a federal program whose spending is not dependent upon
annual appropriations acts. A responsive entitlement is a program whose rules provide for granting
benefits to all claimants who meet specified criteria. Super, Political Economy of Entitlement, supra note
219, at 652–55.
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times. SNAP also contains authority for the USDA to liberalize eligibility conditions
in areas hit by natural disasters without congressional action.226 UC’s time limits,
however, render it insufficient to aid the acute poor struggling with the protracted
job market weakness accompanying a recession.227 Congress has passed special
extended benefit augmentations to UC in each of the past several recessions, but it
has both been slow to start these programs and quick to end them;228 because
liberals have been worried about being seen as expanding aid to the chronic poor,
they have made no serious attempt to tie extended benefits to an economic formula
rather than the need for new congressional action for each recession.
States, in turn, could expand their ability to respond to acute poverty by
building up large balances in rainy-day funds or by building up reserves in their
TANF and other block grants. In practice, these balances, when they exist at all,
have been far short of what was required to meet a significant share of the acute
poor’s needs in even a modest economic slump.229 As a result, states have sharply
tightened eligibility for anti-poverty programs within their control during recessions,
disproportionately harming the acute poor in the short-term but weakening
protections for all low-income people over the longer run.230 Moreover, high
unemployment associated with the Great Recession of 2007–09 lasted longer than
most states had anticipated in setting their UC taxes, resulting in the exhaustion of
their trust funds and pressure to cut benefits to the acute poor as their programs
subsisted on federal loans.231
Even the way we keep and report records of expenditures in human services
programs skews focus toward the chronic poor. Participation in SNAP, Medicaid,
TANF-funded cash assistance and other important anti-poverty programs is
reported as monthly averages. This leads naturally to dividing annual expenditures
into this number to determine what appears to be an average annual benefit cost
per person. In fact, however, many people participate for only relatively short
periods in these programs. Thus, the actual number of people getting SNAP over
the course of 2015 was not the average monthly enrollment of 45.8 million232 but
226.
227.
228.
229.

7 U.S.C. § 2014(h) (2018).
STONE & SHAW, supra note 166.
Id.
ELIZABETH MCNICHOL & KWAME BOADI, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
WHY AND HOW STATES SHOULD STRENGTHEN THEIR RAINY DAY FUNDS: RECESSION
HIGHLIGHTED IMPORTANCE OF FUNDS AND NEEDS FOR IMPROVEMENTS 1 (2011), https://
www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-3-11sfp.pdf [ https://perma.cc/RG3L-DJKT ].
230. See Super, Laboratories of Destitution, supra note 154 (finding that states have structural
impediments to responding reliably to the most serious needs of low-income people).
231. Michael Leachman, Bill for Inadequate Unemployment Insurance Taxes Now Coming Due in
Many States, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES ( Jan. 30, 2012, 5:29 PM), https://www.cbpp.org/
blog/bill-for-inadequate-unemployment-insurance-taxes-now-coming-due-in-many-states [ https://
perma.cc/YF95-UDLQ ].
232. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM STATE ACTIVITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 2 tbl.1, 4 (2016), https://fnsprod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/FY16-State-Activity-Report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
R9JB-DWGG ].
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about half—again as many, roughly 70 million. Correspondingly, the average annual
benefit for these 70 million would be $1,000 rather than the reported $1,500.233
Expanding access to SNAP to more of the chronic poor might cost about $1,500
per new recipient, but bringing in the same number of acute poor people would
cost far less.
III. POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO ACUTE POVERTY
Discussions of how to respond to chronic poverty tend to have a certain
sameness—and a deep futility. Massive redistribution goes fundamentally against
the U.S. political culture.234 This country has tried coercive approaches
extensively—most prominently in the implementation of the 1996 welfare
law—and has failed to produce any secondary benefits that remotely offset the
direct harm they inflict. Indeed, a significant body of research suggests that, by
throwing low-income people’s lives into chaos and foreshortening their time
horizons, these approaches may actually impede transitions to greater
self-sufficiency.235 In between the redistributive and coercive extremes are two
others: a social work–oriented group that holds up various local projects as models
that could be emulated236 and policy wonks who suggest tinkering with existing
programs.237 The social work and policy wonk approaches offer short-term political
plausibility, yet they actually exacerbate the long-term political problem by making
promises they cannot keep. As Blank points out, “[i]f we expect too much of any
one program, we will inevitably be disappointed.”238
Alleviating the hardships of acute poverty raises a very different set of strategic
questions. First, the acute poor are far less prominent in political and academic
discussions. Before the acute poor can win a debate, the debate must first occur.
Second, as noted above,239 they lack a substantial political constituency. Those
that seek to aid the chronic poor either do not consider, or find less compelling, the
plight of the acute poor. Critics of the chronic poor, in turn, may find rhetorical
advantage in differentiating the acute poor, but those whose goal is to shrink or
dismantle anti-poverty programs generally have little reason to make a focused
effort to preserve aid to the acute poor. And the stigma of poverty largely prevents
233. See id. at 1 tbl.1, 55 tbl.45.
234. MCCALL, supra note 152, at 196–201.
235. Thus, for example, single mothers with the lowest incomes must spend a great deal of time
cultivating the informal support networks on which they depend to meet short-term emergencies. EDIN
& LEIN, supra note 55, at 149–58. See CYNTHIA MILLER, MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH
CORP., EXPLAINING THE MINNESOTA FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM’S IMPACTS BY HOUSING
STATUS (1998) (finding the beneficial effects of a welfare-to-work demonstration project concentrated
among those receiving housing subsidies, perhaps because that afforded them a measure of stability).
236. See EDELMAN, supra note 65 (holding up several education and training examples).
237. See, e.g., David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions Control
and the Rules of Legislative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093 (2010) (suggesting consolidation of federal
housing assistance to facilitate offsetting the effects of carbon emissions controls).
238. BLANK, supra note 57, at 292.
239. See supra Section II.D.
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their most logical allies—economically insecure people who were acutely poor in
the past or are likely to become so in the future—from prioritizing their needs.
“Good jobs” is a much more rousing political slogan, even if it often is one beyond
the reach of government policies.
Third, as a result of the political indifference to the acute poor, the dominant
model for responding to their needs has been one of discretionary charity, which is
grossly underfunded and ill-equipped to respond to their financial dilemmas.
Finally, even those that would like to assist the acute poor often lack the
understanding and empathy to do so effectively. The policies set out in the previous
Part are far more ignorant than they are malicious, at least toward the acute poor.
This Part offers some preliminary ideas on how we might more adequately
meet the needs of the acute poor. Recognizing the obstacles to doing much for the
acute poor, its goals are relatively modest, placing interventions within the general
structure of existing U.S. public welfare law. Section A suggests a set of normative
and practical principles for policies seeking to relieve acute poverty. Section B then
gives specific examples of how those principles might be effectuated.
A. Principles to Guide Responses to Acute Poverty
One goal for any policy changes surely should be helping those experiencing,
or fearing, acute poverty. This serves both obvious short-term humanitarian ends
and can help prevent acute poverty’s destructiveness from threatening their return
to relative prosperity. This also is a political necessity: the economically insecure
have grown deeply cynical as their supposed interests have often been invoked to
support policies that overwhelmingly benefited others.240
But a second, also crucial, goal should be to aid the acute poor without further
isolating them from the chronic poor. And to be clear, the chronic poor as a group
face significantly more severe hardship than the acute poor: they experience almost
everything that the acute poor do and much more beyond. They may have
somewhat lower expenses and more expertise dealing with the social welfare system,
but their reserves of informal assistance are more likely to be tapped out—as often
will be their inner reserves of hope and determination. Policies that ameliorate the
very real plight of the acute poor at the expense of the chronic poor would not
enhance social justice.241 Fortunately, such trade-offs are unnecessary and indeed
counterproductive for all concerned.
Preserving and enhancing confluences of interests between the acute and
chronic poor can benefit both. As politically weak as the chronic poor are, they are
more likely to have a political identity as people benefiting from human services

240. See, e.g., CHUCK MARR & CHYE-CHING HUANG, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
GOP TAX PROPOSAL RISKS A SUBSTANTIAL TAX SHIFT FROM HIGH-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS TO
LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (2011),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/11-18-11tax.pdf [ https://perma.cc/BNK5-5CA3 ].
241. Duncan et al., supra note 113, at 88.
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programs. The acute poor, in turn, are more like, and hence more sympathetic to,
middle-income policymakers and voters. This could improve their standing in the
politics of empathy and conceivably in power politics as well.
An example of this kind of politics in the United States can be seen in health
care reform. Single-payor advocates sought to improve health care coverage for
everyone, hoping to harness the politics of universal programs. Although they could
boast substantial efficiency savings, a major part of their political problem was that
many of the middle-class people who would benefit from expanded benefits and
simpler claims procedures were not sufficiently dissatisfied with their current
benefits, and sufficiently valued their supposed independence from the
government, that they provided little help against critics driven by gross cost,
ideological opposition to expanding government, or industry-specific self-interest.
The actual Affordable Care Act (ACA) combined conventional targeting of the
chronic poor (that segment excluded from Medicaid) with protection to the acute
poor that might lose health care coverage due to loss of employment or a medical
crisis. Enough people could envision themselves experiencing acute poverty in this
manner to give ACA enough political support to pass and to allow its political
supporters to survive opponents’ onslaughts.242 Alas, ACA’s clumsy targeting, and
particularly its dependence on annual accounting periods for determining eligibility,
have helped to prevent it from being greeted enthusiastically enough by the
economically insecure to make its coalition easily replicable.
The key interests of acute and chronic poor people alike is to overcome the
destitution model of assistance, which has humiliated the chronic poor and turned
away the acute poor, and the discretionary charitable model of assistance, which has
served primarily as an excuse for not helping in more substantial ways rather than
as a source of assistance in its own right. Doing so will be challenging, as both of
these models arose in response to fears about the moral hazard, and those fears are
deeply embedded in U.S. political thinking. A frontal assault on them thus likely will
fail. Substantial progress is possible, however, by reducing the influence that each
of them enjoys and giving greater prominence to other models that can better meet
low-income people’s needs while reducing economic insecurity. A great
improvement would be a system that initially provides assistance to the acutely poor
under more humane and trusting terms, only shifting to more austere approaches
as an eventual fallback.
B. Specific Remedies
Assisting the acute poor outside of the destitution and discretionary charity
models could be done in several ways. An obvious first step would be to repair and
strengthen existing social insurance programs to assist a larger share of the acute
poor. Requiring states to provide actuarially sound financing for UC, expanding it
242. See Super, Modernization of American Public Law, supra note 163 (describing the long-run
ramifications of ACA’s reordering of the politics of human services).
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to cover kinds of workers that have become increasingly common since the
program was designed—such as part-time workers, those in two-earner families,
and those in the “gig economy”—would be important first steps. Legislation passed
in response to the coronavirus pandemic shows how this can be done, but is
unfortunately time-limited.243 Establishing automatic federal UC benefits for
regional and national recessions (eliminating the need for one-off congressional
legislation) and redesigning the federal loan system so that states are not asked to
repay until their economies have recovered would also be particularly helpful to the
acute poor.
Some additional causes of acute poverty also are highly susceptible to coverage
within social insurance models that are relatively familiar in this country. Paid family
and medical leave would face fierce objections if funded by employers—directly or
through an experience-rated tax like that supporting UC—but could appeal to a
large enough segment of the population to work as a universal program.
Some existing means-tested programs similarly are susceptible to reforms to
make them more effective for the acute poor. “For a program to be effective against
transitory poverty, it should be easy to get on it, easy to get off it, and easy to make
a transition to other sources of income.”244 SNAP requires states to provide
benefits within a week to the poorest third of applicants245 and within a month to
all other eligible claimants.246 For SNAP to serve this function, however, it would
need to restore full eligibility to the millions of childless adults currently subject to
a three-month time limit. Concern for the acute poor helped drive the
near-complete disappearance of vehicle resource limits and many states’ elimination
of asset tests altogether;247 that should become national policy. Arguments about
the acute poor also helped drive repeal of overbroad filing unit rules enacted in
1981 and 1982.248 Both of these changes helped the acute poor and the chronic
poor alike.
The Affordable Care Act relies on the federal income tax system, which
determines income on an annual basis, to administer its premium tax credits and,
by extension, Medicaid. Shifting back to the monthly accounting period Medicaid
historically had used would substantially improve access for the acute poor, but
doing so is unlikely as it would require developing an entirely new administrative
system. An expansion of current provisions for making more generous subsidies

243. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 2102–2116,
134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
244. Bane, supra note 140, at 392.
245. 7 U.S.C. § 2020I(9) (2018).
246. Id. § 2020I(3).
247. Super, Quiet “Welfare” Revolution, supra note 170, at 1347.
248. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1984) (requiring most adult children to be in the same household
with their parents if they live together and imposing the same requirement on most adult siblings),
amended by Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987),
and Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
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available to persons suffering adverse changes in circumstances249 could improve
access to the acute poor if widely understood. So would the amelioration of the
Act’s claw-back provisions for subsidies paid to persons during bouts of acute
poverty whose annual income is greater;250 ironically, toughening the claw-back’s
treatment of the acute poor is one of the very few amendments to the Affordable
Care Act on which Democrats and Republicans have been able to agree. The need
for a federal structure to identify people in need on a more current, rather than
annual, basis became painfully obvious when Congress had to base eligibility for
“advance refunds” of its new coronavirus tax credit on taxpayers’ income during
one of the two previous years251—which may bear little relation to the
circumstances of someone laid off in the recession.
Beyond these existing vehicles, combining more and less generous
programs—merging programs free from the destitution and discretionary charity
approaches with programs built on those models—could help the acute poor. This
would not require more affluent voters to abandon their concerns about moral
hazard. Instead, it would grant limited aid, with limited risks, in the hope that such
aid will suffice for large numbers of acutely poor people with the motivation and
capability to end their bouts of poverty. In the process, it may reduce the number
of acutely poor people that fall into chronic poverty and ameliorate some of the
hardship of the chronic poor.
First, states could advance federal benefit payments more broadly to those in
acute need. A model for this is the interim assistance payments some states make to
applicants for Supplemental Security Income while their applications are pending.
When the Social Security Administration (SSA) approves those applications, it
diverts part or all of the applicants’ retroactive benefits to reimburse the state for
the interim assistance it provided.252 The state bears the risk that SSA will reject an
application on which the state is paying interim assistance, but this mechanism gets
benefits to people in severe need much more rapidly than SSA could at only a small
fraction of the net cost of the payments made. In the same way, states could advance
earned income tax credits and refundable child tax credits for workers that have
suffered reverses.253
Second, UC benefits should transition over the time an unemployed worker
receives them, beginning as pure social insurance and gradually adopting more of
the characteristics of a means-tested program. This is the essence of the German
UC system. All unemployed workers initially participate in a very generous

249. 42 U.S.C. § 18082(b)(2) (2018).
250. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f) (2018).
251. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2301, 134
Stat. 281 (2020) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6428(f)(1), (5)(A)).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g).
253. Although employers for many years theoretically should have been making advance
payment of EITCs to their workers, 26 U.S.C. § 3507 (repealed 2010), in practice only about 1% of
them do so for a variety of administrative and relational reasons.
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programs with relatively modest conditionality. Over time, its benefits phase down,
increasing the financial pressure on the worker to seek and accept employment.
Eventually, a still-unemployed worker is transitioned to a separate UC system that
continues to provide subsistence benefits but with greater conditionality. Although
concern for the acute poor’s needs likely play a relatively minor role in the design
of the secondary program, leaving the chronic poor vulnerable by themselves, both
groups participate together for an extended period in the initial program. A
prerequisite for this approach’s effectiveness would be a dramatic expansion in the
share of the unemployed covered by UC. The temporary Pandemic Unemployment
Assistance program254 Congress established in March 2020 provides a valuable
model for doing so and should be made permanent without linkage to the
pandemic.
And third, this country should join an increasing number of countries around
the world255 in establishing a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program for
low-income people. A CCT, in essence, provides monthly payments to individuals
and families meeting some income threshold so long as the recipients comply with
some basic behavioral conditions, such as school attendance and medical
check-ups. A CCT that is not designed to meet all of a family’s needs could justify
the sort of relatively modest conditionality that could avoid deterring many acute
poor people from participating and demoralizing those that do. Yet this limited
conditionality could help address policymakers’ and voters’ concerns about moral
hazard that otherwise would afflict a simple transfer of cash or near-cash benefits.
With benefits that do not strike more affluent persons as especially generous,
advocates can plausibly argue that the hassle of signing up and of complying with
the conditionality will suffice to deter insincere applicants.256 Setting the CCT’s
benefits below the full cost of sustenance is unappealing, but this country’s history
of allowing cash welfare benefits also to fall far short of meeting basic needs leaves
little political room for a more generous, less demeaning program, at least until the
CCT concept develops a committed constituency.257 CCTs have already been
piloted in New York City and Tennessee with promising results.258
The simplest way to initiate a CCT likely would be as an adjunct to an existing
program. This would save the cost and political liability of establishing a separate
254. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2102, 134
Stat. 281 (2020).
255. See KATHY LINDERT, WORLD BANK, SOCIAL SAFETY NETS CORE
COURSE: CONDITIONAL & UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS (2013).
256. See Super, Offering an Invisible Hand, supra note 193 (finding that such deterrence has
become an increasingly important means of rationing public benefits in the United States).
257. See GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43634, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY
FAMILIES (TANF): ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT AMOUNTS IN STATE TANF CASH ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS 10–13 (2014) (describing steady erosion in states’ cash assistance benefit levels to the point
that even the most generous are far below the poverty line).
258. JAMES RICCIO ET AL., MDRC, CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS IN NEW YORK
CITY: THE CONTINUING STORY OF THE OPPORTUNITY NYC-FAMILY REWARDS DEMONSTRATION
10 tbl.ES.2, 15 tbl.ES.3 (2013).
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eligibility determination bureaucracy, as well as reducing the amount of additional
bureaucratic sophistication the acute poor would need to show to obtain help. If
UC was reformed to broaden the fraction of workers it covers, a CCT might take
the form of a family supplement to CCT benefits, conditioned on children’s school
attendance and health check-ups. Alternatively, it could function as a housing or
clothing supplement to SNAP. As noted, SNAP currently excludes millions of very
low-income childless adults; on the other hand, it has made great strides in reaching
eligible low-income people beyond the chronic poor.259 Medicaid’s annual
accounting periods, as noted, make it a problematic vehicle for reaching the acute
poor, although both health-related conditions and the potential programmatic
savings from ensuring that recipients can afford safe housing would have a
compelling narrative nexus.
CONCLUSION
The sharp increase in attention to inequality has proceeded along two quite
different lines. One addresses the runaway wealth of those at the very top of the
distribution, such as “the one percent.” The other attends to those at the very
bottom of the income and wealth ladder, the expanded ranks of the poor and of the
extremely poor. The former line has received far more attention in the media and
in political campaigns. This reflects Occupy’s efforts as well as the sense that the
one percent’s ascendance is of potential concern to vast numbers of people. As
concern about the one percent’s political influence accelerated as the effects of
Citizens United v. FEC260 became clear, the top-regarding strain of inequality critique
gained broader support.
Yet the precipitous rise of populist insurgencies in both main political parties
suggests that even those not especially interested in poverty need to pay more
attention to those losing out due to rising inequality. Many of the angry rebels are
the economically insecure, those that have experienced bouts of acute poverty or
seen their friends and families do so. They are all too aware of the damage acute
poverty can do, and they are gripped with fear that this damage will leave them and
their children chronically poor. Although their criticism of the government focuses
on economic management—trade, immigration, bailouts for big banks—they are
keenly aware that public programs all too often did little to help them when they
fell into distress. When they complain that our government cares little for people
like them, they are all too right: our political system devotes far too little attention
and money to people in economic distress, and when it does, it concentrates
overwhelmingly (although not benignly) on the chronic poor. Although tens of
millions strong, the acute poor are invisible in our midst.
This invisibility, and demagogues’ efforts to turn the economically insecure
against the chronic poor, must not be allowed to stand. The interests of the acute
259.
260.

Super, Quiet “Welfare” Revolution, supra note 170.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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poor and the chronic poor overwhelmingly coincide. Neither the destitution model,
predominately applied to the chronic poor, nor the discretionary charitable model,
designed for the acute poor, are human or even efficient. A coalition of those
concerned about all low-income people would have a far better chance of success
than anything seen in anti-poverty politics since the Great Depression.
The acute poor provide a face for low-income people that critics will find
much harder to disparage. They also are far more integrated into the communities
of middle- and upper-income people. The remarkable, sudden turnaround in public
opinion about LGBTQ people,261 and their rights to full inclusion in society,
resulted less from technical arguments than from the brave choice of millions of
individual LGBTQ people to come out to those around them. Once straight voters
realized that they knew lesbians and gays, who were no more or less flawed than
other people in their circle, treating LGBTQ people as “other” became untenable.
As Latinos/Latinas and Asian-Americans more commonly live and work alongside
people from families longer in this country, the stereotypes driving anti-immigrant
demagoguery face greater resistance. Advocates for people with disabilities,
particularly for people with mental health challenges, have been pursuing a similar
strategy that shows some early signs of success.262
That has never seemed a particularly viable strategy for anti-poverty advocates.
In our economically stratified society, a great many middle- and upper-income
people really do not know well any chronically poor people. Few are likely to have
a meaningful, empathy-building exchange with their janitors, gardeners, or even
childcare providers. This distance continues to present abundant opportunities for
opponents of anti-poverty programs to paint horrific tales of “behavioral
poverty”263 to convince middle-income voters that something must be deeply
wrong with the poor just as demagogues had demonized LGBTQ people and those
with mental illness.
The acute poor could provide a partial response to this enduring problem,
serving as ambassadors to bring understanding of and empathy for low-income
people generally. Large numbers of middle- and even upper-income people have
suffered acute poverty on at least one occasion, and many more know someone
who has. Seeing through them that poverty is overwhelmingly the result of
economic conditions and bad luck rather than personal vice could transform the
politics of poverty in this country. To be sure, knowing some “good” low-income
people will not prevent more affluent people from accepting stereotypes of the
261. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS (2002) (predicting an evolution in legal arrangements giving same-sex
partners gradually greater rights).
262. Martha M. Lafferty, Tennessee Removes Discriminatory Questions from Attorney Licensure
Application, DISABILITY RIGHTS TENN. (Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.disabilityrightstn.org/resource
s/news/march-2014/tennessee-removes-discriminatory-questions-from-at [ https://perma.cc/BL5SFME2 ].
263. See, e.g., ROBERT RECTOR, HERITAGE FOUND., STRATEGIES FOR WELFARE REFORM
(1993) (contrasting material poverty with behavioral poverty).
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chronic poor, just as some people manage to bracket their friendships with people
of color, LGBTQ people, or people with mental disabilities while maintaining their
bigotries. But it can be a start. Expanding empathy for low-income people is
becoming increasingly important as political attacks on them increase and as the last
of those with personal memories of the Great Depression pass from the scene.
To date, however, this country has made bouts of acute poverty so devastating,
and so painful, that people feel the strong urge to put those episodes behind them
without further thought, much less discuss their experiences with friends. Coupled
with the powerful stigma against low-income people generally, this leaves huge
numbers of people who could humanize the face of poverty very much “in the
closet.” If anything, critics’ persistent if fanciful accounts of the supposedly opulent
lifestyle provided by programs for the chronic poor may build resentment among
acute poor people who are left largely to fend for themselves. Whether the
widespread, common suffering resulting from the coronavirus pandemic legitimates
the acute poor and brings them together with the chronic poor and other natural
allies remains to be seen.
Relieving the suffering of the acute poor is an important end in itself and one
that anti-poverty advocates have far too long neglected. Their hardship is real and
often extreme, the long-term harm they suffer can be as devastating to them as it is
invisible to outsiders. And the cost of helping them is relatively modest because they
typically need help for a shorter period.
But more broadly, by helping the acute poor, we can help all low-income
people. Many of the changes to anti-poverty programs necessary to assist the acute
poor will also make an important difference for the chronic poor. More broadly,
demanding that claimants for public aid assume a destitute, broken, and dependent
role is brutalizing for acute and chronic poor people alike, exacerbates the fissures
in our social fabric that poverty causes, and ultimately undermines the programs
imposing those rules. If the chronic poor have any hope of escaping the isolation
and ostracism they now suffer, tying their fate more closely to that of the acute poor
is as politically indispensable as it is morally just.
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